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ESCAPING THE CONFLICT TRAP: 
PROMOTING GOOD GOVERNANCE IN THE CONGO 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Democratic Republic of Congo’s strides toward 
peace could prove short-lived if the government and 
donors do not increase efforts to create a transparent 
and accountable government. State institutions such as 
parliament, courts, the army and the civil service remain 
weak and corrupt. The national elections scheduled for 30 
July 2006 risk creating a large class of disenfranchised 
politicians and former warlords tempted to take advantage 
of state weakness and launch new insurgencies. Donors 
must initiate new programs in support of good governance 
that include more funding to strengthen state institutions 
(in particular parliament and the various auditing bodies), 
as well as apply more political pressure to make sure 
reforms are implemented. 
The Congolese state has suffered from corruption since 
independence. The logic of the 2002 peace agreement, 
which established the current political transition, has 
brought problems of governance into sharp relief. 
Senior positions in the administration and state-run 
enterprises were shared between signatories, and state 
resources were siphoned off to fund election campaigns 
and private accounts. Between 60 and 80 per cent of 
customs revenues are estimated to be embezzled, a quarter 
of the national budget is not properly accounted for, 
and millions of dollars are misappropriated in the army 
and state-run companies. The mining sector is particularly 
prone to corruption, with valuable concessions granted 
with little legitimate benefit to the state. 
These governance problems have an immediate impact 
on the humanitarian situation. Unpaid soldiers harass 
and intimidate civilians. Factions within the army and 
government continue to fight over mines and control of 
border crossings. The displaced civilians have almost no 
health services to fall back on, and 1,000 or more die 
daily as a result.  
While international attention has concentrated on elections, 
the other elements of a stable democracy are weak or 
missing, including the necessary checks on executive 
power. Parliament is poorly funded and divided, mirroring 
the weakness of political parties. Parliamentary inquiries 
lack necessary resources and expertise to be effective. The 
judiciary is deeply politicised and inadequately funded. 
Not a single official has been tried during the transition 
for corruption. Presidential and legislative candidates 
should have – but have not – presented detailed plans 
for addressing corruption in customs, public finance and 
natural resources. 
The incoming government will offer new opportunities for 
improving governance. The president, parliament and 
local governing bodies will be democratically elected 
and in theory accountable to their constituencies. Twenty-
six provinces are to be created out of the current eleven, 
each with locally elected provincial assemblies, and to 
manage 40 per cent of national revenues raised on their 
territories. Three new high courts will replace the current 
Supreme Court. But without international support and 
funding, these institutions will remain largely a shell. 
Donors have treated corruption as a technical problem 
and emphasised data management systems, training 
programs and laws. They have shied away from the more 
political aspects, such as strengthening parliament, courts 
and anti-corruption and auditing bodies. They finance 
more than half the national budget and should do more to 
press charges against corruption suspects, make sure 
the government complies with the mining code and hold 
multinational corporations accountable for violating 
national and international norms. 
A complete overhaul of the approach to good governance 
is needed after the elections, with much greater focus on 
strengthening institutions, especially parliament and courts. 
The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper the new government 
is to publish later this year is already substantially 
prepared but it should be supplemented by more detail 
on anti-corruption initiatives and parliamentary capacity 
building. Major donors should then launch plans to 
promote governance over a five-year period and at the 
same time create a successor group to the International 
Committee for the Support of the Transition to coordinate 
their actions and their pressure on the incoming government 
to implement the promised reforms. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS 
To the Incoming Government of the Democratic 
Republic of Congo: 
1. Fund parliamentary commissions sufficiently and 
cooperate with their investigations. 
2. Strengthen the judiciary by supporting legislation to 
guarantee the independence of the courts and by 
funding them adequately. 
3. Complete a census to get ghost officials off 
payrolls and raise salaries of civil servants above 
the poverty level. 
4. Create a National Program in Support of 
Governance to coordinate all actions on behalf of 
good governance, headed by an anti-corruption 
czar appointed by the president upon proposal of 
parliament and provided with sufficient means to 
carry out the duties.  
5. Promote accountability and transparency in the 
management of natural resources by: 
(a) creating a sub-commission within the 
National Program in Support of Governance 
to apply the criteria of the Extractive 
Industry Transparency Initiative, including 
publishing all financial transactions 
between companies and the government; 
(b) incorporating the provisions of the 
Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative 
into domestic law; 
(c) licensing an international NGO to monitor 
implementation of the mining and forestry 
codes, in collaboration with the Ministry 
of Mines and the Mining Inspection; 
(d) providing the anti-corruption czar and the 
sub-commission for natural resources with 
websites on which to publish all payments 
and mining contracts between the 
government and private companies and 
to which complaints can be submitted; and 
(e) installing truck scales for mineral ore at 
border crossings and laboratory equipment 
for mineral analysis. 
6. Create an international oversight body within the 
National Program in Support of Governance and 
deploy international personnel in all government 
oversight bodies. 
7. Create a cell within the Ministry of Finance 
responsible for recording and investigating the 
declarations of assets made by members of 
government before and after their tenure.  
8. Carry out the decentralisation outlined in the 
constitution by: 
(a) setting up a commission within the Ministry 
of the Interior to plan and implement 
creation of the 26 new provinces and their 
provincial assemblies; and 
(b) creating local offices for the state auditor 
and financial inspector, as well as for the 
National Program in Support of Governance 
initiated in the government’s anticipated 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. 
To Presidential and Legislative Candidates in the 
30 July 2006 Elections: 
9. Present detailed programs on how to reduce 
corruption, in particular in public finances, customs 
and natural resources. 
To the Incoming Parliament: 
10. Discuss, during the first session, the Lutundula 
Commission report on contracts signed during 
the two wars and renegotiate or cancel mining 
and forestry contracts that are not in the state’s 
interest. 
11. Create a permanent parliamentary commission 
on natural resources to review contracts signed 
since 30 June 2003 and monitor compliance with 
the mining and forestry codes as well as management 
of revenues in the mining and forestry sectors.  
To Congolese Civil Society: 
12. Address issues of governance and corruption 
through pressure on national and provincial 
elected representatives, including by tracking 
their voting records. 
13. Put more focus on corruption, including by 
conducting advocacy based on Congolese laws, 
as well as on the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development Convention on 
Combating Bribery, the Extractive Industry 
Transparency Initiative, and the U.S. Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act. 
14. Create an NGO network dedicated specifically 
to governance issues with a regularly updated 
website.  
To the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund: 
15. Work with the government to ensure that, in 
accordance with Article 46 of the mining code, 
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titles to state-owned mining fields are granted 
through open tenders. 
16. Promote transparency and environmental protection 
in the forestry industry by: 
(a) encouraging the government to enforce 
the moratorium on concessions;  
(b) completing the zoning exercise to 
distinguish lands available for industrial 
logging from those reserved for community 
activities and environmental protection; 
and 
(c) contracting an NGO to work with the 
Ministry of Environment to monitor 
compliance with the forestry law and 
ensure that tax revenues flow back to 
local communities and concessions granted 
comply with the zoning exercise. 
17. Participate in a group with major governmental 
donors to coordinate funding and other actions, 
in particular in the field of good governance.  
18. Increase funding to state anti-corruption bodies, 
including the proposed National Program in Support 
of Governance, the State Auditor, the Financial 
Inspectorate and parliamentary commissions. 
To France, the UK, the U.S., Belgium, South 
Africa, the EU, the World Bank, the International 
Monetary Fund, the African Development Bank 
and Other Major Donors: 
19. Form a new donors group on good governance to 
coordinate funding and policy advice to the new 
government, regularly discuss governance issues 
with key ministries and government anti-corruption 
bodies and work closely with the proposed National 
Program in Support of Governance. 
20. Put together a five-year donor plan, based on the 
new government’s anticipated Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Plan and the United Nations Development 
Program’s Congo Action Plan, that conditions a 
substantial funding increase on steps to increase 
accountability and reduce corruption and 
includes: 
(a) funding for parliamentary commissions 
at the national and provincial level, in 
particular the commissions on natural 
resources and economic and financial 
affairs; 
(b) reform of the judiciary, including an 
emergency plan for the East and support 
for setting up the new High Court of 
Appeals, Constitutional Court and State 
Council; 
(c) placement of international personnel in 
major anti-corruption bodies; 
(d) support for the creation of 26 provincial 
assemblies within three years, including 
funding for infrastructure and training; and 
(e) direct financial and technical support to 
the State Auditor, the Army Inspectorate 
and the Financial Inspectorate. 
21. Contract an international auditing firm to train 
and advise the Ministry of Finance cell in charge 
of recording and investigating government 
officials’ asset declarations.  
To Major Investors and Trade Partners of the 
Congo, including Belgium, France, the U.S., South 
Africa, China, Germany, Portugal and the UK: 
22. Use export credits to promote accountability 
with national companies by granting them only 
to companies that disclose all payments to 
governments and demonstrate respect for 
international and domestic laws and norms, 
including environmental, labour and anti-bribery 
laws and norms. 
To the United Nations Mission in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (MONUC): 
23. Create a cell within the Political Affairs Division 
to monitor and report on good governance in 
coordination with donors.  
Nairobi/Brussels, 20 July 2006 
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ESCAPING THE CONFLICT TRAP: 
PROMOTING GOOD GOVERNANCE IN THE CONGO 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The erosion and collapse of state institutions was a 
proximate cause of the Congo’s two wars between 
1996-1997 and 1998-2003. By the time Rwanda 
invaded in 1996, President Mobutu Sese Seko’s abusive 
government had so badly undermined the army, 
administration, parliament and court that the local 
population greeted the Rwandan-backed rebels with 
euphoria. However, the new government of President 
Laurent Kabila was similar in many ways, and state 
institutions remained weak and corrupt. In the East, rebel 
movements established ad hoc administrative structures 
bent on extracting natural resources and taxes. The 
country was essentially divided into large fiefdoms 
ruled by military movements.  
The Global and Inclusive Agreement, signed by the 
belligerents, political opposition and civil society in 
South Africa in December 2002, dramatically changed 
the country’s power structure. President Joseph Kabila, 
who succeeded his late father, shared power with four 
vice presidents named respectively by Kabila’s former 
government, the political opposition and the main rebel 
movements – the Congolese Rally for Democracy 
(RCD) and the Movement for the Liberation of the 
Congo (MLC).1 A bicameral parliament was established 
(national assembly and senate), whose members were 
named by the signatories to the peace deal.2 A 
transitional constitution guaranteed separation of 
powers, independence of courts and basic civil liberties. 
However, the transitional government has been 
marked by intense political infighting, lack of 
accountability and corruption. 
A new constitution approved by referendum in December 
2005 and promulgated in February 2006 has established a 
 
 
1 The vice presidents are Abdoulaye Yerodia Ndombasi 
(former government), Zahidi Ngoma (political opposition), 
Azarias Ruberwa (RCD) and Jean-Pierre Bemba (MLC).  
2 The signatories of the peace deal were the RCD, the former 
Kabila government, the MLC, the political opposition, civil 
society, the Mai-Mai, the RCD-National and the RCD-
Liberation Movement. 
system in which a fairly strong president will share 
power with a prime minister chosen from the majority 
party or coalition in parliament. Although legal texts 
provide numerous checks and balances as well as 
oversight mechanisms to guard against abuse of 
power and corruption, parliament, auditing bodies and 
courts are weak, untrained and lack resources to do 
their jobs. The state is not able to collect revenue or 
provide basic services. In 2005, revenue amounted to 
only 10 per cent of Congo’s gross domestic product 
(GDP).3 The government spent less than 2 per cent of 
its national budget outside Kinshasa.  
The international community has focused on the 
immediate goal of elections, which are now scheduled 
for 30 July 2006. However, donors, who have provided 
over $6 billion in the past five years in development 
aid and support for the elections, have paid relatively 
scant attention to promoting viable state institutions. 
Most have considered rebuilding the state a technical 
problem and concentrated on infrastructure, administrative 
capacity and expert advice. State institutions such as 
parliament, courts and oversight bodies have been a 
secondary consideration.4 Security sector reform, itself a 
critical component of good governance, has also 
lagged. Donors have assisted in training around 20,000 of 
the country’s 90,000 to 120,000 soldiers but only in 
recent months have begun to tackle pressing problems 
such as corruption and parallel chains of command.5 
Integrated brigades have suffered from desertions, 
cholera epidemics and crippling corruption.  
Donors and agencies are launching new development 
programs and appeals for funds to support the incoming 
government. The UK government is increasing its aid 
to some $147 million in 2006, the European Union (EU) 
 
 
3 The sub-Saharan average is 18 per cent. “Country Overview: 
Uganda, 2005”, European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/ 
comm/development/body/country/ug/home.  
4 International aid totalled $1.2 billion in the 2006 budget. 
Figures denoted in dollars ($) in this report refer to U.S. 
dollars. 
5 Crisis Group Africa Report N°104, Security Sector Reform 
in the Congo, 13 February 2006. The EU launched a 
program to reform management of the army payroll for the 
integrated brigades in January 2006.  
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will spend around $91 million and the UN has 
launched a humanitarian aid appeal for $681 million 
for the year. While donors are increasing their focus 
on good governance and strengthening state institutions, 
the programs are often under-funded and not backed 
up by coordinated political pressure from the embassies.  
Recent studies by the World Bank and academics 
have shown the close link between conflict and the 
failure of state institutions. Almost half the countries 
emerging from conflict fall back into conflict within 
five years, and there is a strong correlation between 
such recidivism and the failure of institutions such as 
parliaments.6 A combination of resources and effective 
political pressure is needed to address Congo’s deep-
seated governance problems and prevent it from sliding 
back toward conflict. 
This report examines sectors that are particularly 
vulnerable to corruption and graft, including customs, 
natural resources, state-run companies and the army. 
It also discusses why regulatory bodies such as courts, 
parliament, and anti-corruption and auditing institutions 
remain ineffective and prone themselves to corruption. 
Finally, it reviews international approaches to good 
governance and proposes new ways of addressing 
corruption and the abuse of power in Congo. 
 
 
6 Paul Collier et al., “Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and 
Development Policy”, World Bank, Washington DC, 2003; 
Daniel Esty, Jack Goldstone, Ted Robert Gurr, Barbara Harff, 
Marc Levy, Geoffrey Dabelko, Pamela Surko and Alan N. 
Unger, “State Failure Task Force Report: Phase II Findings”, 
Science Applications International Corporation, 2000. 
II. THE LEGACY OF POOR 
GOVERNANCE 
The Congolese state and economy still bear the heavy 
imprint of Mobutu’s 32 years of predatory rule. Executive 
power in his Zaire was absolute, and the 1974 
constitution granted him, as head of state, authority 
over the executive, legislature and judiciary branches. 
Mobutu also had the right to change the constitution 
at his discretion, and he banned political parties while 
making membership in his Popular Revolutionary 
Movement (MPR) compulsory. Through the MPR he 
controlled most aspects of society, particularly in the 
west and north. MPR cadres held key trade union, 
student association and security services positions.  
To forestall any threats, Mobutu kept his government 
factionalised while maintaining the loyalty of elite 
military and police forces. Corruption was integral to 
the system, and politicians became entirely dependent 
on his good will. In the first decade of his rule, 1965-
1975, only 41 of the 212 top figures in government 
kept their positions.7 There were frequent purges in 
army and government. Many senior officials were 
imprisoned or rotated into different positions or from 
one geographical area to another. 
All this came at great economic cost. After the 
stabilisation of the economy in 1967, the country 
enjoyed several years of relative prosperity and growth. 
However, Mobutu needed money to maintain his 
patronage network. In some years, he personally disposed 
of over 20 per cent of the country’s operating budget.8 
At the same time, huge loans were taken out to build 
white elephant projects, including a dam on the Congo 
River for $1 billion and a steel mill at Maluku for 250 
million that was barely functional. By the mid-1970s, 
profligacy and corruption had crippled the economy.  
Mobutu’s disastrous system was facilitated by continued 
support from France, Belgium and the U.S. Zaire was 
a key pawn in the Cold War, and each of these countries 
had considerable economic and political interests in 
it.9 Zaire’s debt was rescheduled fourteen times between 
1976 and 1990, when the Bretton Woods institutions 
 
 
7 Crawford Young and Thomas Turner, The Rise and 
Decline of the Zairian State (Madison, 1985), p. 166. 
8 Ibid, p. 169. 
9 The U.S. was particularly concerned about socialist 
regimes in neighboring Angola, Congo (Brazzaville) and 
Tanzania. It funneled funds through Mobutu to the Angolan 
UNITA rebels, who used Zaire as a rear base. 
Escaping the Conflict Trap: Promoting Good Governance in the Congo 
Crisis Group Africa Report N°114, 20 July 2006 Page 3 
 
 
finally cut off new funds. At that point, the country 
had accumulated $14 billion in debt.10 
The rule of Laurent Kabila, who toppled Mobutu in 
1997, was similar in important aspects.11 He banned 
political party activity, dissolved parliament and suppressed 
all provincial and local deliberative bodies.12 There 
was no state budget between 1998 and 2001 and no 
new constitution. Laws were issued by presidential 
decree. Collaboration ended with international financial 
institutions, which were pressing him to investigate 
war-time massacres. He gave Zimbabwe management 
of many copper, cobalt and diamond mines in return 
for military support. Similarly, in the East, the rebels 
financed their armies with revenues from gold, diamond, 
coltan and tin mines,13 much of which went to 
Ugandan and Rwandan officials, whose armies were 
closely involved in the mines. Military spending, lack of 
financial oversight and poor monetary policy 
produced near economic collapse. By 2000, inflation 
was 511 per cent and per capita GDP $100 – far below 
the $259 level at independence 40 years earlier.14  
Laurent Kabila’s assassination in 2001 ushered in an 
era of halting reform and relative growth. Donors 
reengaged and sponsored a stabilisation plan that 
included new investment, mining and forestry codes 
and reformed fiscal and monetary policies to cut inflation 
and boost revenue. GDP growth was 7 per cent in 
2005, while national revenues tripled between 2000 
and 2005.15 These reforms have been coupled with 
increases in aid, which in 2006 amounted to 56 per 
cent of the national budget.16 
Nonetheless, this economic growth is somewhat 
misleading. The increase in GDP is largely due to the 
 
 
10 Thomas Callaghy, “Life and Death in the Congo”, Foreign 
Affairs, September/October 2001.  
11 Laurent Kabila tried to hold local elections when he came 
to power, but quickly gave up on the experiment. 
12 This included provincial assemblies and communal and 
territorial councils. 
13 Coltan is shorthand for Columbite-tantalite, a metallic 
ore comprising Niobium and Tantalum widely used in 
electronics manufacture. The most exhaustive study of this 
pillage was conducted by a UN Panel of Experts, which 
issued seven reports and addendums between January 2001 
and October 2003: S/2001/49, S/2001/357, S/2001/1072, 
S/2002/565, S/2002/1146, S/2002/1146/Add.1, S/2003/1027. 
14 “Staff report”, International Monetary Fund, op. cit., p. 5. 
15 Ibid, p. 28 and “Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo”, IMF, 16 August 2005, p. 4. 
16 Budget 2006, ministry of budget, http://www.radiookapi.net/ 
_fichiers/documents_fichier_43.pdf. Only 17 per cent of foreign 
aid is direct budgetary support managed by the Congolese 
government. The rest is aid managed by donors or contracted 
out to private companies in coordination with the government.  
state’s improved fiscal control over activities previously 
in the informal sector. Few jobs have been created, 
and there has been little foreign capital investment, 
as many large multinational companies remain 
apprehensive.17 The budget increase from 10 per cent 
of GDP in 2002 to 17 per cent in 2004 was mostly due to 
unification of revenue agencies and the inclusion of 
demobilisation and election expenses, which are 
donor-funded.18  
 
 
17 Crisis Group interview, international banking official, 
Kinshasa, November 2005. 
18 “Democratic Republic of Congo”, African Economic 
Outlook, 2004/2005, OECD, www.oecd.org/dev/aeo. In 2004, 
for example, the budget included $300 million for 
demobilisation and reintegration of combatants. 
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III. CORRUPTION AND GRAFT 
Corruption continues to undermine the economy and 
administration. The abuse of public office for personal 
gain reaches from minor civil servants to the highest 
members of government and implicates many international 
corporations.19 Political actors regularly interfere in 
the administration, customs service, army and control 
of natural resources to embezzle funds. This, in turn, 
has perpetuated a system of governance that is largely 
predatory, with the state living off the citizenry and 
the country’s resources without providing even the 
most rudimentary social services. A telling illustration 
was given by a World Bank survey. People were 
asked: “If the state was a person, how would you interact 
with him?” Often the response was: “Kill him”.20 
A. THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPARATUS 
Corruption and politicisation within the administrative 
apparatus undercuts the state’s capacity to collect 
revenues or use them for salaries or social services. 
The Congo has one of Africa’s weakest collection 
capacities, with revenues (excluding aid) amounting 
to just over 10 per cent of GDP, compared to some 13 
per cent for Rwanda and Tanzania and 18 per cent for 
Kenya. Hundreds of millions of potential tax dollars 
are embezzled or lost due to inefficiency.21  
Hiring and promotions in the administration depend 
more on connections than competence. Mobutu, Laurent 
Kabila and Joseph Kabila have all placed political 
appointees in management positions, creating deep 
tensions between career civil servants and party 
cadres.22 While Congolese law in theory gives ultimate 
decision-making power to ministry secretaries general, 
who are usually career civil servants, this is rarely the 
practice. Political appointees often sideline or overrule the 
secretaries general.23 In addition, the government has 
 
 
19 Evidence is provided by parliamentary investigations, 
including the audit of state-run companies led by Gregoire 
Bakandeja and the review of contracts signed during the two 
wars led by Christophe Lutundula. 
20 “Democratic Republic of Congo: Economic and Sector 
Work, Governance and Service Delivery”, World Bank 
Report no. 32205, 30 June 2005. 
21 The ratio of revenue to GDP is often used as a measure of 
state capacity and legitimacy. Figures at www.imf.org. In 
addition to poor revenue collection, much of the Congolese 
economy is in the informal sector. Despite mineral riches, 
official GDP per capita in the Congo is half that of Rwanda 
or Kenya.  
22 “Economic and Sector Work”, World Bank, op. cit., p. ii. 
23 Ibid, pp. 8-9. 
attached “missions” to the ministries that essentially 
serve as a parallel chain of command. While such 
missions are not unusual in a French-based administrative 
system, they are meant to be created for a limited 
period. In the Congo, they often last for years.24 An 
international financial expert commented: “The 
proliferation of institutions is one of the main reasons 
for corruption”.25 
Administrative capacity is limited. For example, in 
2004, the ministry of finance had little information on 
the income generated by state-run companies, few of 
which submitted financial accounts.26 Similarly, an audit 
of the state payroll revealed no correlation between 
pay slips and the civil servant database. The procedure for 
adding new employees lacked transparency, and numerous 
institutions and individuals could add employees to 
the payroll.27 The census of civil servants undertaken 
by France and South Africa to eliminate ghost workers 
and illegal entries has been underway for more than a 
year and is still not concluded.28 
The rules governing the release of money from the 
central bank through ministries are poor. In 2003, two 
thirds of the budget was spent outside normal procedures 
with only retrospective justification.29 By 2004, this 
had declined to 27 per cent,30 but the presidency 
overspent by $18 million. Vice President Jean-Pierre 
Bemba alone exceeded his budget by some $11 
million.31 In theory, once a budget line is exhausted, 
the institutions in the cost chain should cut off access 
to funds. In practice, politicians regularly override such 
restrictions.32 A joint International Monetary Fund 
(IMF)-World Bank evaluation of budgetary 
management in November 2004 revealed that the 
Congo fulfilled only three of sixteen good governance 
 
 
24 Crisis Group telephone interview, World Bank official, 
April 2006. 
25 Crisis Group interview, international financial expert, 
Kinshasa, November 2005. 
26 “Case study on the DR Congo: Anti-corruption projects 
limited by the logics of transition”, report for UNDP by Karen 
Hussman and Marie-Ange Bunga, 12 October 2005, p. 10. 
27 “Economic and Sector Work”, World Bank, op. cit., p. 14. 
28 Crisis Group telephone interview, diplomat, Kinshasa, 
April 2006. 
29 “Observations de la cour des comptes relatives au projet 
de loi portant arret des comptes et reglement definitif du 
budget de l’etat pour l’exercise 2003”, Journal officiel de la 
Republique Democratique du Congo, 24 June 2004. 
30 Crisis Group interview, State Auditor, April 2006. 
31 Crisis Group interview, state auditing office, Kinshasa, 
November 2005. All vice presidents overspent by large 
amounts.  
32 Crisis Group interview, international financial officials, 
Kinshasa, November 2005. 
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criteria, with only partial internal oversight and many 
budget lines that were either drastically over or 
underspent.33 In May 2006, questions about 
transparency prompted the IMF to freeze $40 million 
in new loans.34 
Civil servants have been steadily impoverished by graft. 
There are an estimated 90,000 to 120,000 soldiers and 
600,000 civil servants.35 Their monthly base salaries 
range from $50 for a janitor to $77 for a doctor and 
$111 for a judge.36 In contrast, ministers receive 
monthly wages of $4,000, while some directors of 
state-run companies earn $25,000.37 Low salaries have 
also led to brain drain, as many qualified officials take 
jobs with NGOs or the UN. A driver for the UN 
Development Program (UNDP), for example, makes 
between $450 and $750 monthly.38 
Low wages combined with absence of oversight or 
sanctioning bodies has prompted many civil servants 
to extort money from the population to survive. A study 
conducted along trade routes in Equateur and Bandundu 
provinces showed that over 90 per cent of taxes had 
been arbitrarily created at the local level and were 
illegal. Only 4 per cent reached the national treasury.39 
This is both a burden on the local population and a 
drain on state resources. 
B. CUSTOMS OFFICE 
The state-run Office of Customs and Excises (OFIDA) 
generates the most income of all fiscal services – $348 
million in 2005, 36 per cent of total revenue – but is 
 
 
33 “Republique Democratique du Congo: Suivi des depenses 
relatives à la reduction de la pauverte”, Joint mission by the 
IMF and World Bank, November 2004, p. iv. 
34 “Congo needs elections for new IMF deal – minister”, 
Reuters, 11 May 2006. 
35 Crisis Group interview, World Bank and EU officials, 
Kinshasa, November 2005. Real figures may be much lower. 
A recent audit of civil servants in Kinshasa discovered that 
around 70,000 of the 170,000 on the payroll did not exist. 
38 Crisis Group interview, administrative official, Kinshasa, 
May 2006. In 2003, the signatories of the peace deal agreed 
on a new salary scale for civil servants (the Mbudi 
Agreement), which provided for an almost ten-fold increase. 
The new salary scale was not respected. State employees do, 
however, often receive bonuses, and for judges these 
constitute the bulk of their income. 
37 African Economic Outlook, OECD, op. cit.  
38 Crisis Group interview, UNDP official, Kinshasa, May 2006. 
39 “Combating Low-level corruption on the Waterways in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo: Approaches from 
Bandundu and Equateur Provinces”, by Michael Brown, 
Philippe Ngwala, Albert Songo and Leonard Wande for 
Innovative Resources Management, October 2004. 
also probably the greatest source of revenue loss.40 
Private consultants and the UN estimate that between 
60 and 80 per cent of custom duties – $870 million to 
$1.7 billion – are not collected.41 Loss of customs duties 
in the East is one of the most direct links between 
corruption and conflict, as militias finance their operations 
through taxes they collect at border crossings. 
In Ituri, militias regularly clash over control of border 
posts, causing hundreds of deaths.42 A UN expert panel 
investigating violations of the arms embargo revealed 
that customs duties helped fund creation of the Congolese 
Revolutionary Movement (MRC) in 2005, which has 
been the cause of widespread violence in Ituri. It estimated 
that $4 million was embezzled or not collected by 
OFIDA in Ituri in the first ten months of 2005.43  
In North Kivu, high ranking RCD officials are alleged 
to be complicit in embezzlement of duties in Goma.44 
Some officials there are linked to Laurent Nkunda’s 
militia, which has attacked the army numerous times 
since 2004.45 The border crossing at Kasindi, 100 km 
north of Goma, where RCD-ML officials and Congolese 
army officers have been accused of embezzlement, has 
seen its revenues decrease from $1 million to $400,000 
since 1996.46  
Kasumbalesa in Katanga, the only export route to 
Zambia, is the site of large-scale smuggling of copper, 
 
 
40 “Rush and Ruin”, Global Witness, September 2004, p. 12; 
2006 Congo Budget. 
41 “Report of the United Nations expert panel on the arms 
embargo in the Democratic Republic of the Congo”, 26 July 
2005, UN S/2005/436, p. 15. 
42 Crisis Group Africa Report N°64, Congo Crisis: Military 
Intervention in Ituri, 13 June 2003; Crisis Group Africa 
Report N°84, Maintaining Momentum in the Congo: The 
Ituri Problem, 26 August 2004. 
43 “DR Congo militias increase attacks in Ituri”, Agence France-
Presse, 29 March 2006; “Thousands of civilians used as human 
shields in Ituri”, OCHA press release, 2 March 2006; “Report of 
the United Nations expert panel on the arms embargo in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo”, UN S/2006/53, 27 January 
2006, p. 14. 
44 Crisis Group interview, RCD-ML officials, Goma, December 
2005. 
45 The UN panel suggests that money from customs and 
immigration goes to financing the NGO Everybody for Peace 
and Development, which is close to North Kivu Governor 
Eugene Serufuli. This NGO has helped transport weapons and 
soldiers for Nkunda and RCD dissidents. Crisis Group 
interviews, RCD officials, Goma, December 2005. UN expert 
panel report, op. cit., 27 January 2006, p. 15. 
46 Crisis Group interviews, RCD-ML officials, Goma, December 
2005; “Nord-Kivu: La fraude cause de la baisse de recettes 
douanières à Kasindi”, Radio Okapi, 18 Febraury 2005, 
www.radiookapi.net.  
Escaping the Conflict Trap: Promoting Good Governance in the Congo 
Crisis Group Africa Report N°114, 20 July 2006 Page 6 
 
 
cobalt and other minerals. A study by Global Witness 
concluded that the 13,720 tons of cobalt and copper 
concentrate exported legally through Kasumbalesa 
each month is likely only a fraction of actual exports.47 
With cobalt prices around $35,000 per ton and the 
export tax on cobalt 1 per cent, the estimated monthly 
loss is in the millions of dollars.  
A review by the independent British consultants Crown 
Agents revealed a weak and poorly structured customs 
office suffering from “antiquated practices and procedures, 
lack of infrastructure and equipment, excessive 
bureaucracy, overstaffing of posts, endemic 
corruption, smuggling and the widespread acceptance of 
malpractice, such as facilitation payments and 
undervaluation or mis-description of goods”.48 State-
licensed private intermediaries are a key part of the 
corruption chain, arranging for goods to be 
undervalued or smuggled. The World Bank has 
helped reform procedures at the most profitable 
customs post, the port of Matadi. Creation of the 
“guichet unique” there in 2003, replacing at least twelve 
separate payments by one, helped increase revenues 
by 280 per cent between 2002 and 2005 and 
highlighted the loss through proliferation of taxation 
agencies.49 The World Bank plans a similar initiative 
at Kasumbalesa.  
While this is welcome, centralising duties will not 
eliminate corruption. Greater oversight is needed over 
OFIDA by the state auditor, and courts must prosecute 
those accused of corruption. In addition, there is an urgent 
need at border crossings for truck scales (weigh bridges) 
and laboratory equipment to perform mineral analysis. 
Ideally, OFIDA’s border performance should be subjected 
to regular spot checks by an independent firm. 
C. MINING AND FORESTRY 
1. Corruption in mining  
The role of natural resources in fuelling conflict in the 
Congo has been amply documented.50 The Congo used to 
 
 
47 “Rush and Ruin”, Global Witness, op. cit., p. 11. 
48 UN expert panel report, 25 January 2006, op. cit., pp. 24-25. 
49 Crisis Group interview, Gabriel Mwepu Numbi, director 
of OFIDA, Matadi, November 2005. 
50 For information on mining in the Congo, see “The Same 
Old Story: A Background Study on Natural Resources in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo”, Global Witness, June 
2004; “Report of the Parliamentary Commission on the 
Examination of the Validity of Contracts Signed During the 
1996/7 and 1998 Wars”, known as the Lutundula Report, at 
www.freewebs.com/congo-kinshasa; three reports of the UN 
expert panel on the illegal exploitation of natural resources in 
be the world’s largest producer of cobalt and one of 
the main suppliers of industrial diamonds and copper. 
It is also rich in gold, tin, uranium, zinc and silver. While 
mining made up 80 per cent of GDP at independence, 
by 1990 the sector had collapsed due to mismanagement 
and the decline in world copper prices. In 2004, it 
accounted for only some 9 per cent of GDP and less 
than 1 per cent of revenue.51 Copper production – once 
the bedrock of the economy – shrunk from 465,000 tons 
in 1990 to 19,000 tons in 2002.52 Industrial mining 
and refining has all but halted, and much of the 
infrastructure is run-down or looted. By the beginning 
of the 1996 war the only parastatal still producing 
significant amounts was the diamond company 
Société Minière de Bakwanga (MIBA), with annual 
production of $70 million.53  
To raise money for the war, all belligerents sold minerals 
to, and signed mining contracts with, multinational 
corporations and smaller mining entrepreneurs. In 2000, 
the UN mandated a panel of experts to look into the 
illegal exploitation of natural resources. According to its 
2001 to 2003 reports and subsequent NGO reports, the 
belligerents made money in mining by:54 
 offering monopolies in exchange for kickbacks;55  
 embezzling from state-run companies;56  
 creating joint ventures in which politicians were 
shareholders;57 and 
                                                                                        
the Congo, April 2001 (S/2001/357), October 2002 
(S/2002/1146) and October 2003 (S/2003/1027). 
51 Rise and Decline, op. cit., p. 295; “Selected Issues and 
Statistical Appendix”, op. cit., pp. 47, 51. 
52 “Document de Stratégie pour la Réduction de la Pauvreté, 
Draft No 3 pour Discussions”, Ministry of Planning, December 
2005, pp. 73-74. 
53 George Coakley, “The Mineral Industry of Congo-
Kinshasa, 1997”, U.S. Geological Survey. 
54 UN expert panel report, April 2001, op. cit., pp. 32-33.  
55 The most renowned case involved the grant of a monopoly 
to International Diamond Industries (IDI) for exporting 
diamonds in 2000 in return for $20 million dollars. The 
agreement was revoked within months but the founder of 
IDI, Dan Gertler, was awarded rights to buy 88 per cent of 
the Congo’s diamonds at a discount of 3 per cent for four 
years. In return, he gave MIBA a $15 million interest-free 
loan. Similarly, the RCD rebellion gave a coltan export 
monopoly to the financier and arms dealer Aziza Gulamali. 
Lutundula Report, op. cit., pp. 52-55. 
56 Between 1999 and 2001, 54 per cent of taxes from MIBA, 
$35 million, were given in cash to officials working for the 
company, who allegedly shared it with political patrons. One 
of Laurent Kabila’s ministers admitted to getting $2.3 million 
from MIBA in 1999 for war expenses. Ibid, pp. 64-65. 
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 taking kickbacks on numerous contracts with terms 
unfavourable to the state.  
Similar rackets continue to deprive the state of valuable 
resources. Between $80 million and $100 million in 
diamonds are believed to be smuggled out of the country 
every year.58 
In the former rebel-held territories, the focus is on 
gold and cassiterite, a mineral refined to make tin, the 
price of which tripled between 2002 and 2004. Until 
2005, much of the mineral came from artisanal mines 
in areas controlled by the former RCD rebels in North 
Kivu. Cassiterite is transported to Goma, then to 
Rwanda for refining. Traders benefit from close links 
to RCD officials in Goma and Rwandan authorities 
across the border. As recently as June 2004, Rwandan 
army officers were reported to be deployed in the 
Walikale area of North Kivu to organise shipments.59 
The loss to the state is hard to estimate but several 
sources indicate that little revenue from cassiterite 
moving through Goma reaches Kinshasa.60 According 
to Congolese data for 2004, production in North and 
South Kivu was 7,591 tons worth $7.6 million, and 
there have been numerous reports of smuggling 
involving Congolese army officers through the border 
posts in Kasindi, Bukavu and Goma.61 Following the 
failure of a mutiny in North Kivu in late 2004, the 
former RCD rebels lost control of many cassiterite mining 
areas, although trade networks with local businessmen 
remain. 
Gold smuggling has been equally troublesome in 
north eastern Ituri, on the Ugandan border. Although 
the Ugandan army withdrew from the Congo in 2003, 
                                                                                        
57 In return for their support in the war, Laurent Kabila 
created joint ventures with Zimbabwean partners. 
Sengamines was an example. Founded in 2000 with equal 
Zimbabwean and Congolese shares, it controlled 45 per cent 
of MIBA’s concessions in return for an unknown sum of 
money and had broad tax exemptions. Between 2000 and 
2004, it produced 2,524,034 carats of diamonds, which, 
depending on quality, could be worth between $12 million 
and $300 million. Ibid, pp. 31-49. 
58 Crisis Group telephone interview, Global Witness, April 2006. 
59 For more information on cassiterite and conflict in North 
Kivu, see Crisis Group Africa Report N°91, The Congo’s 
Transition is Failing: Crisis in the Kivus, 30 March 2005; and 
“Under-Mining Peace – Tin: The explosive trade in cassiterite 
in eastern DRC”, Global Witness, June 2005.  
60 Under-Mining Peace, op. cit., p. 31; Crisis Group 
interviews, provincial officials, Goma, January 2005. 
61 Under-Mining Peace, op. cit., pp. 28-30; ex-RCD 
Lieutenant Colonel Rama was punished in Bukavu for 
smuggling cassiterite in 2005; see also “Nord-Kivu: La 
fraude, cause de la baisse de recettes douanières à Kasindi”, 
Radio Okapi, 18 February 2005, www.radiookapi.net.  
its officers have continued to support Congolese proxy 
militias, which in turn have killed thousands of civilians 
while fighting for control of gold mines. Human Rights 
Watch has argued that the “chain of Congolese middlemen, 
Ugandan traders, and multinational corporations forms 
an important funding network for armed groups 
operating in the north eastern Congo”.62  
According to the Congolese government, gold exports in 
2004 were only $7.4 million, in stark contrast to the $58 
million in Congolese gold that the UN estimated went 
through Uganda that year. Uganda itself has traditionally 
produced less than $50,000 a year in gold.63 
After the Congolese army took control of the main gold 
mining town of Mongwalu in 2005, it, too, reportedly 
became involved in gold smuggling. Officers, including 
the Ituri commander, General Bob Ngoy, have allegedly 
helped businessmen smuggle significant amounts of gold 
out from Mongwalu to Kigali – a UN source suggested 
between $2 million and $6 million in two shipments 
alone.64 Elsewhere in Ituri, the MRC militia founded in 
July 2005, allegedly with Uganda’s support, controls 
important border crossings.  
2. Political interference  
Minerals are the largest Congolese export, over 60 per 
cent of the total,65 and on paper the situation in the 
mining sector has improved slightly since Joseph Kabila 
came to power. In 2002 the World Bank helped draft 
new mining and investment codes and funded a retirement 
scheme for 10,000 employees to streamline the bloated 
Gécamines workforce. 
In practice, however, the sector remains deeply 
troubled. While most leadership positions in the state-
run enterprises were shared out between the parties to 
the peace deal in late 2005, Kabila’s party was slow 
to relinquish control over Gécamines and MIBA (the 
largest state-run mining companies). More importantly, 
the presidency kept control over new contracts and 
concessions. All state-run companies are still regulated by 
a Mobutu decree that deprives managers of these 
companies of any real power66 and gives ultimate 
 
 
62 “The Curse of Gold”, Human Rights Watch, June 2005, p. 
3.  
63 UN expert panel report on the arms embargo, S/2005/436, 
26 July 2005, pp. 20-21.  
64 Crisis Group interview, Human Rights Watch official, 
Nairobi, April 2006. 
65 “Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix”, op. cit., p. 86. 
66 The law is no. 78/002. See “The State vs. the People: 
Governance, mining and the transitional regime in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo”, Fatal Transactions and 
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authority for all state-run companies to the president 
and the ministries. Congolese legal experts believe 
there was greater transparency in mining under Mobutu in 
the 1980s, as the state-run companies and ministries 
negotiated most of the contracts which are now often 
handled through the presidency.67  
A letter allegedly sent by Kabila’s party chairman in 
Lubumbashi to the national headquarters and leaked 
to the press gives a good summary of how mining in 
the province has been politicised. It expressed appreciation 
for the generous donations of six Gécamines directors 
and the current and previous governors of Katanga 
and named several other prominent businessmen and 
politicians, the vice governor of the central bank and 
the director of the mining parastatal Office de Mines 
de Kilo Moto (OKIMO) as well.68 While such donations 
are not illegal, the letter implied that some may have 
been given in the name of the institutions and not 
privately. 69 
Mining sector reform, led by the World Bank, was 
supposed to lead to privatisation, eliminate political 
interference and promote efficiency. The World Bank 
pushed for the properties of state companies like 
Gécamines to be sold through open tenders. This has 
not happened. Gécamines reached deals with private firms 
in an opaque process that granted companies very 
favourable terms. Hence, while the logic of privatisation 
was to reduce corruption and political meddling in the 
mining sector, it actually accentuated the problems.70 
Given the Congo’s risky investment climate, it is difficult 
to evaluate how much better a deal could have been 
struck, but the lack of open tenders has fuelled 
suspicions of kickbacks and corruption. The sale of 
significant state assets requires approval of the 
council of ministers, presided over by the president, 
so the process was subject to political interference. 
The Belgian International Peace Information Service 
(IPIS) concluded from its interviews with international 
mining advisers that:  
The parastatal directors usually do most of the 
negotiating of the joint venture agreements [between 
                                                                                        
International Peace Information Service (IPIS), March 2006, pp. 
34, 46. 
67 Crisis Group electronic communication, Congolese legal 
expert, May 2006; Crisis Group interviews, international 
mining lawyer and former high-ranking Mobutu official, 
Kinshasa, June 2006. 
68 “The State vs. the People”, op. cit., pp. 72-73. 
69 These officials later stated that these donations were 
private. Crisis Group interview with local NGOs, Kinshasa, 
June 2006. 
70 International businessmen in Kinshasa have corroborated 
these allegations. Crisis Group interview, Kinshasa, July 2005. 
the state-run mining companies and private 
corporations], but they receive directives from 
Kinshasa officials, often the president himself, 
or advisors in his entourage….A recurrent element 
in negotiations allegedly is the Congolese officials’ 
demands for kickbacks, which, if granted, evidently 
lead to conditions that are disadvantageous to 
the state and the parastatal.71 
Gécamines itself is beholden to political interests. 
Under the terms of the peace agreement, the ministry 
of mines was supposed to be controlled by the opposition. 
However, just before the transitional government 
came to power, Kabila created a Permanent Committee 
for the Restructuring of Gécamines, which transferred 
administrative control to the presidency.72  
In an effort to block political meddling in the granting 
of new concessions, the World Bank pressured the 
government to create a mining registry that would 
deal with applicants on a first-come-first-served basis. 
The government opened the registry in April 2003 as 
part of mining sector reforms that began with the 
drafting of a new code in 2002. To expedite applications, 
the mining registry was given a legal deadline of one 
week to evaluate a request before sending it on to the 
ministry of mines.  
Instead of reducing political interference, however, 
the mining registry became part of the problem. Its 
first director was Ambroise Mbaka, a close Kabila 
associate. He did not respect the first-come-first-served 
principle, and political meddling in the granting of 
concessions was evident.73 Mbaka was dismissed under 
World Bank pressure but in November 2005 Jean-
Felix Mupande, another close presidential associate, was 
named his successor.74  
3. The Lutundula Commission 
The peace deal signed in South Africa in 2002, which 
established the transitional government, provided for 
a parliamentary commission to review all contracts 
signed during the two wars to make sure they conformed 
with Congolese law and their benefits accrued to the 
state. The commission, headed by an opposition 
parliamentarian, Christophe Lutundula, faced numerous 
 
 
71 “The State vs. the People”, op. cit., p. 34.  
72 Ibid, p. 46. 
73 Ibid, p. 69. But according to various sources, the true origin of 
the political meddling was the presidency. See “Comment 
Evariste Boshabe a tué Ambroise Mbaka Kawaya”, Le Soft, 9 
June 2004; Crisis Group telephone interview, country specialist, 
Johannesburg, April 2006.  
74 “The State vs. the People”, op. cit., p. 69. 
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difficulties, in particular obstruction by the former 
belligerents. Parliamentarians from Kabila’s party 
repeatedly tried to block its creation in parliament, 
and some of the former belligerents refused to answer 
its requests for information.75 The commission’s report, 
submitted to parliament in June 2005, suggested that the 
management of natural resources had worsened during 
the transition and recommended that many contracts 
be reviewed.76 It shed light on past abuses and 
identified serious flaws in ongoing operations: 
 There are no independent evaluations of the value 
of the concessions, making the bidding process 
arbitrary and allowing authorities to undervalue 
concessions.  
 Partners are often incorporated offshore with no 
liability; if the venture goes bankrupt, the Congolese 
firm is left holding the debt. 
 Partners often do not respect the terms of their 
agreement, provide no social services and do not 
process the raw minerals in the country, as 
required by law; as a consequence, the Congo loses 
substantial value-added taxes from refining.77 
 Some companies, including large ones such as 
Sengamines and Anvil Mining, pay few or no 
taxes due to exemptions granted by their contracts.78 
The report stresses that unless the terms of existing 
contracts are altered, the mining sector will bring little 
profit to the state. In the meantime, Gécamines, which 
from 1967 to 1985 contributed between 20 per cent 
and 30 per cent of national revenue, has gone bankrupt. In 
2004, it produced a paltry $400,000 in state revenues.79 By 
30 December 2005, when the French company 
Sofreco was given co-management, most of its most 
valuable properties had been bartered away.80 
The Lutundula Report urged that no new concessions 
be given out or mining operations privatised until a 
new government was in power after elections and 
recommended that all contracts signed since the 
beginning of the transition be cancelled. According to 
Human Rights Watch, however, grants given for 
mining exploration increased four-fold in the second 
 
 
75 Ibid, pp. 24-25. MLC, RCD-National and PPRD officials 
refused to respond to commission queries. 
76 Lutundula Report, op. cit., p. 270. 
77 Congolese law requires companies to use domestic 
refineries if feasible. Several could be used. 
78 Lutundula Report, op. cit. 
79 “The State vs. the People”, op. cit., p. 33. 
80 Ibid, p. 45. 
half of 2005.81 Parliament has not discussed the report 
and is unlikely to do so before the elections. There has 
also been little pressure for discussion from embassies in 
Kinshasa, fuelling rumours of international complicity 
with mining entrepreneurs.82 
Two deals in particular attracted the attention of 
mining experts. In August 2005, President Kabila approved 
contracts between Gécamines and two young companies: 
Katanga Mining, Ltd. and Global Enterprises Corporate. 
They are owned in part by George Forrest and Dan 
Gertler, respectively, who have been mentioned in a UN 
report on the illegal exploitation of natural resources.83 
Lutundula, as well as an independent study commissioned 
by the World Bank in 2002, recommended that these 
contracts – under negotiation at the time – be frozen and 
renegotiated through a transparent tender process.84 The 
concessions contain some of the country’s largest copper 
and cobalt reserves. A group of European NGOs protested 
the contracts and hired a private law firm specialised 
in mining contracts to investigate them. The firm 
concluded that numerous aspects of the contracts did 
not conform to standard mining practice, for example 
the lack of an international tender process and remuneration 
reserved for Gécamines so low that it is unlikely to 
profit from the deal and could possibly go into debt.85  
If the government now tries to renegotiate or cancel 
existing contracts, it might be sued for violating 
international investment conventions, which could lead to 
international arbitration. In this case, however, the 
government could argue that the conditions in which 
the contracts were signed violated domestic law, in 
particular clauses in the mining code requiring an 
 
 
81 “Democratic Republic of Congo: Elections in Sight: 
“Don’t Rock the Boat”?, Human Rights Watch, 15 December 
2005, p. 14. 
82 Crisis Group interviews, embassies and parliamentarians, 
Kinshasa, November 2005 to April 2006. 
83 UN expert panel report on illegal exploitation of natural 
resources, April 2001, op. cit., p. 33 (Gertler); Ibid, October 
2002, pp. 8-11, 35-42 (Forrest). Katanga Mining, Ltd is a 
joint venture owned by the Belgian George Forrest and the 
Canadian Arthur Ditto, while Global Enterprise Corporate is 
owned by the Israeli Dan Gertler. 
84 Lutundula Report, op. cit., pp. 175-176. 
85 Memorandum from Rights and Accountability in 
Development (RAID) of 20 February to CIAT, World Bank, 
and the transitional government. Under the terms of the 
contracts, it can be assumed that profits will first reimburse 
the private partners for the loans with which they financed 
the project. As operation and management costs were not 
specified, RAID believes that even after the loan has been 
paid back, there will be little to no profit for Gécamines, as 
the managing partners could exaggerate operating costs. See 
http://www.raid-uk.org/docs/DRC_contracts/Memo_DRC_ 
Contracts.pdf. 
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open tender to be issued, and deadlines for the start of 
exploitation. The World Bank has commissioned a 
legal audit of the mining sector after which it will be 
better able to advise the incoming government. Wherever 
the government can renegotiate unfavourable contracts, it 
should do so. It should also make sure contract terms 
and the requirements of the mining code, in particular 
the in-country processing of minerals and provision of 
social services to the local population, are implemented. 
Congolese institutions such as the mining registry and 
the mining inspectorate (a body within the ministry 
responsible for local oversight) need to be given the 
resources to fulfil their mandates. At the same time, 
parliament and anti-corruption bodies must intensify 
oversight and inspection of natural resources.  
4. Forestry 
The Congo contains approximately half Africa’s rain and 
humid forests.86 Nonetheless, due to the poor investment 
climate and the inaccessibility of many concessions during 
the war, tax revenues on logging were only some $2 
million in 2002, less than 1 per cent of the national total.87 
Smuggling is a major problem; there are indications actual 
timber export is seven times higher than official figures.88 
But the sector is undergoing a revival of sorts; many 
concessions inaccessible during the war, primarily in 
Province Orientale and Equateur, are again being logged. 
The EU and the Ministry of Environment reviewed 
the forestry sector in 2004 and concluded that the 
Congo was producing only one-sixtieth of its 
potential. Due to the very low concession fees, 
companies occupy much more land than they actively 
use, hoping to sublease to other investors once there 
is economic and political stability.89 Despite pressure 
from the World Bank and other donors, forestry taxes 
are only $0.20 per hectare per year, far lower than 
elsewhere in Africa.90 
In 2002, President Kabila declared a moratorium on new 
concessions and promulgated a forestry code. Concessions 
were reviewed and 163 contracts for 25 million hectares 
cancelled. However, subsequent studies indicate fifteen 
million hectares of new concessions were granted and 
2.4 million hectares reinstated.91 Revenue services 
 
 
86 Crisis Group interview, forestry expert, Paris, April 2006.  
87 National revenues in 2002 were around $431 million. For 
the 2002 budget, see www.minifinrdc.cd.  
88 Crisis Group interview, forestry expert, Paris, April 2006. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Rainforest Foundation, Friends of the Earth letter to 
Director of the World Bank, 2 December 2006, p. 6. 
91 Nikki Reisch (Bank Information Centre), Michelle Medeiros 
(Friends of the Earth) and Shannon Lawrence (Environmental 
failed to find seven companies with concessions totalling 
over one million hectares whose postal addresses and 
telephone numbers were fictitious.92  
A year-long legal review of all logging contracts is in 
progress in order to cancel those that are flawed. The 
World Bank is funding an independent observer for this 
process but international and local NGOs have voiced 
concerns that, given the limited time frame and prospect 
of political manipulation, the review will not be thorough 
and will not take into consideration local community 
interests. Only two of the seventeen seats on the 
responsible inter-ministerial committee are reserved for 
civil society and one for a local community representative. 
Government officials occupy the remaining seats.93  
As in other sectors, the World Bank’s strategy relies 
on fostering development by stimulating private sector 
growth and investment, assuming that these will raise 
the standard of living for the entire country. The weakness 
of government institutions, however, has badly limited 
economic returns at the community level. While 40 per 
cent of forestry taxes are supposed to go to local 
communities for development, this rarely happens.94 In 
addition, local and international NGOs have complained 
that the government and the World Bank have not 
fully considered the traditional land rights of forest-
dwelling communities.95 It is crucial that all voices be 
heard as the government prepares to demarcate the areas 
available for industrial logging and community use. 
D. THE ARMED FORCES 
1. Corruption in the army: “Operation retour”  
Corruption in the armed forces has been particularly 
detrimental. It has been relatively easy for some 
commanders to embezzle their troops’ salaries. In 
December 2005, a foreign military expert close to the 
defence ministry suggested that $3.5 million to $5.8 
million was being embezzled monthly from the $8 million 
                                                                                        
Defence), “The World Bank in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo”, update March 2006. Kabila issued another decree in 
October 2004, revoking the illegal concessions. 
92 Crisis Group interview, forestry expert, Paris, April 2006. 
93 “Visit to the Democratic Republic of Congo”, Bank 
Information Centre, Environmental Defence, April 2006, p. 4. 
94 Ibid, p. 3 
95 “New Threats to the Forests and Forest Peoples of the 
Democratic Republic of Congo”, The Rainforest Foundation, 
briefing paper, February 2004, p. 4. The World Bank says it 
will consider local interests in the zoning exercise, and 
communities are ultimately better off with logging and 
economic development. 
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set aside to feed and pay soldiers.96 The troops, who 
live in terrible conditions, in turn harass and extort the 
local population. The army is itself the largest single 
threat to civilians in the country, while the police in 
many areas are still seen as a menace. Embezzlement 
has decreased but not ended in 2006 thanks to the 
introduction of a payroll mechanism independent of 
the chain of command instituted by the EU in January 
and better surveillance by Congolese authorities but 
the army continues to be plagued by lack of troop 
discipline in many parts of the country.97  
Officers receive paltry wages compared to politicians. 
A general’s monthly salary is around $80, compared to the 
minister’s $4,000 and the parliamentarian’s $1,500. A 
colonel complained: “We spilled our blood so our 
politicians could get a place in government – is this 
all we get in return?”98 The low wages and still poor 
internal control mechanisms give rise to embezzlement 
schemes, the most notorious of which, called “operation 
retour”, is practiced in both the army and the police.99 
When the commanding officer of a unit receives the 
payroll, he sends a percentage – often 10 per cent – back 
to his commander.  
According to interviews with senior Congolese and 
foreign military officers, this system is practiced from 
the head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to brigade commander 
level, although now at decreasing levels due to payroll 
reforms.100 An example was reported in the Ituri 
police in 2005. When Major Banga wi Miseka of the 
Rapid Intervention Battalion was arrested in July after 
stealing $11,000 of the payroll, a trail of corruption was 
revealed that led to the upper echelons of the force. A 
military court investigation discovered Western 
Union receipts indicating he sent back to Kinshasa 
$80,000 of the $120,000 he had received for wages, 
medicine and logistics.101  
Corruption has left little for average soldiers. For the 
first two transition years, they were to be paid $12 in 
 
 
96 Crisis Group interview, military expert, Kinshasa, October 
2005. Crisis Group Report, Security Sector Reform in the 
Congo, op. cit.  
97 The mechanism is starting with the integrated brigades and 
is meant to include all army units by the end of the year. 
Crisis Group interview with independent military experts, 
Kinshasa, June 2006 
98 Crisis Group interview, Bukavu, December 2005. 
99 Crisis Group interview, Congolese army commander, 
Bukavu, April 2006. 
100 Crisis Group interviews, Kinshasa and Bukavu, November 
and December 2005. 
101 Pascal Kambale, “Corruption dans l’armée et les forces de 
l’ordre : coupez la tête, pas le bras”, Le Phare, 26 September 
2006. 
wages and receive an additional $8 for food a month. 
In early 2006, they were given a raise to $24 a month, 
still well below the poverty line. There are few if any 
provisions for shelter and medical care. The fourth 
integrated brigade had 236 cholera cases soon after its 
deployment to Ituri.102 Crisis Group found that in two 
of three units visited in South Kivu and Katanga, 
troops had either not been paid in three months or had 
received less than half what they were owed.103  
Military operations are business opportunities for some 
commanders. An example was the Kanyabayonga crisis 
of November 2005, when 10,000 troops were sent east 
to deal with RCD dissidents in North Kivu. As much as 
$30 million was likely embezzled during the operation.104 
The government chartered airplanes in which both 
President Kabila and Vice President Bemba owned 
shares and flew food rations from the Kivus to 
Kinshasa and then back east again.105 Many soldiers 
were not paid or fed, which led to mass desertions and 
the looting of villages.  
Perhaps most costly is the continued bloating of the 
payroll with ghost soldiers. When the transition began, all 
former belligerents exaggerated their troop strength to 
gain important political and military positions as well 
as to embezzle funds. The army payroll for the first 
two years was 340,000 – at least 210,000 of whom 
did not exist. South Africa began an army census in 
2005 but has not released results. While military 
experts estimate the army has between 90,000 and 
120,000 soldiers, salaries and food rations for roughly 
double the actual number – worth some $2.5 million a 
month – were embezzled.106 While payroll reform has 
made for marked improvements, the census of the 
armed forces should be made publicly available to 
serve as a basis for rational restructuring of the security 
forces and the elimination of ghost soldiers.  
The above machinations have had a demonstrably negative 
impact on discipline. A UN commander described a visit 
to a company in South Kivu during a joint UN/Congolese 
offensive against the FDLR Rwandan rebel group: 
“The last position on the frontline was manned by a 
lieutenant who only had flip-flops on. He told me his last 
meal had been a day and a half ago and they had run 
 
 
102 “DRC-East Africa: 236 soldiers infected with cholera”, 
IRIN, 26 August 2005. 
103 The visits were in Sange and Bukavu, South Kivu, in 
December 2005 and April 2006 and in Lubumbashi, Katanga 
in July 2005. 
104 “Elections in sight”, op. cit., p. 10. 
105 Crisis Group Report, The Congo’s Transition is Failing, 
op. cit., p. 15. 
106 Crisis Group Report, Security Sector Reform in the 
Congo, op. cit. 
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out of clean water”.107 The military commander of 
Katanga, General Widi Divioka, was dismissed after he 
used military trucks and trains for private trade, 
preventing them from bringing food to his troops. 
More than twenty died of hunger in the Kamina camp, 
allegedly due to his mismanagement.108  
Left to their devices, soldiers often turn on the local 
population to survive: 
 When the army deployed the 63rd brigade to central 
Katanga to attack the Mai-Mai in November 
2005, $250,000 destined for the operation allegedly 
went missing.109 According to international 
humanitarian officials, soldiers went to the camps 
of displaced people (IDPs) they were supposed 
to protect to extort money and food.110  
 In February 2006, 700 soldiers from Aba in 
Province Orientale ransacked the town of Aru, 
raping and abusing civilians.111  
 A crime wave broke out in Bukavu in March and 
April 2006 after soldiers were deployed around 
the town.  
 A special forces unit mutinied against its 
commander in Ituri during an operation against a 
local militia, accusing him of stealing their pay.112 
In February 2006, the UN mission (MONUC) gave the 
government a list of abuses committed by the army during 
joint operations, including dozens of cases of executions, 
rapes and pillaging. MONUC has threatened to stop 
supporting the army unless these crimes are addressed113 
but little has been done to remedy the situation.  
2. Control mechanisms: The inspector general 
and EUSEC 
The army has an internal control mechanism – an inspector 
general (Inspection générale des forces armées), 
responsible for overseeing financial management of 
the armed forces as well as the use and maintenance 
 
 
107 Crisis Group interview, Bukavu, April 2006. 
108 “Congo general accused as soldiers die of hunger”, 
Reuters, 17 March 2006. 
109 Crisis Group interview, senior Congolese administrative 
official, Lubumbashi, November 2005. 
110 Crisis Group telephone interview, UN official, February 2006. 
111 Alphonse Maindo, “Creating an Integrated National Army 
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo”, Netherlands 
Institute of International Relations, April 2006, p. 3. 
112 Crisis Group interview, UN official, Kinshasa, February 2006.  
113 “UN says won't support Congo army if abuses continue”, 
Reuters, 8 February 2006. 
of equipment.114 His legal mandate is ambiguous, as 
the Ministry of Defence has not yet submitted a draft 
law to the council of ministers, as required by the Law 
on the Organisation of the Armed Forces. However, 
Kabila named General Olenga, a close associate of 
the presidential military establishment, to the post in 
2004. Since then and despite numerous reports of 
corruption in the armed forces, he has not ordered a 
single audit or investigation.115 His office is poorly 
funded, and he lacks the means to carry out his tasks.  
The second control mechanism is the military court 
system. Military justice was reformed in 2002 to 
address arbitrary sentencing and abuse of due process. 
However, the High Military Court lacks a legal library 
and a courtroom and has not tried a serious crime since its 
inception in 2003.116 Courts-martial in the provinces 
are mostly no better off. Crimes committed by soldiers 
ranging from embezzlement to rape go unpunished. 
Commanders such as Jerome Kakwavu from Ituri and 
Gabriel Amisi from the former RCD continue to serve 
although the UN and human rights groups have compiled 
extensive documentation on their actions.117  
Military tribunals have convicted several officers in 
2006, including in a trial in Equateur during which 
legislation that reflected many of the provisions of the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
was applied to sentence seven officers to life in prison 
for mass rapes.118 Thomas Lubanga, a prominent Ituri 
warlord, has been indicted by the ICC and transferred 
to The Hague for trial. These trials are welcome first steps 
but the majority of crimes still go unpunished.  
Another means for promoting accountability in the 
military is a payroll mechanism proposed by the EU’s 
military advisory mission to the Congo, EUSEC. It 
has put management of the payroll for the integrated 
brigades in the hands of EU military experts, 27 of 
whom are being inserted into the army administrative 
 
 
114 The body was created by Article 118 of Law no. 4/023 on 
the Organisation of the Defence and the Armed Forces, 12 
November 2004. 
115 Crisis Group interviews, international and Congolese 
military experts, Kinshasa, May 2006. 
116 “S.O.S. Justice”, Global Rights, August 2005, p. 43. 
117 For example, “Ituri: Covered in Blood”, Human Rights 
Watch, July 2003; “Ituri: A Need for Protection, a Thirst for 
Justice”, Human Rights Watch, October 2003; “Congo: 
Kisangani Residents Again Under Fire”, Human Rights Watch, 
May 2002; “Eastern Congo Ravished: Killing Civilians and 
Silencing Protest”, Human Rights Watch, May 2000. 
118 ”Songo-Mboyo: 7 soldats condamnés pour crime contre 
l’humanité”, www.radiookapi.net, 13 April 2006. The Congolese 
state was also asked to pay $5,000 in damages to the rape 
survivors. 
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structure to handle payments down to the brigade 
level. However, EUSEC is small and depends heavily 
on MONUC for logistics. Cooperation between the 
two bodies has reportedly been inconsistent.119 For the 
mechanism to be sustainable – EUSEC’s mandate is 
not indefinite – internal control and auditing within 
the army need to be strengthened and given adequate 
resources. Above all, commanders who embezzle funds 
must be punished. There is much anecdotal evidence 
of such embezzlement but investigations are 
exceedingly rare. 
 
 
119 Crisis Group interview, international military adviser, 
Kinshasa, May 2006. 
IV. STATE OVERSIGHT: WEAKNESS 
AS A STRATEGY 
Institutions that are supposed to serve as checks and 
balances on the executive are often under-funded and 
weak. Keeping them that way is a political strategy in 
Congo.  
A. PARLIAMENT 
1. Inadequacies of the transition parliament 
The transition parliament included a national assembly 
with 500 deputies and a senate with 120 senators. The 
peace deal defined power-sharing in these bodies, 
dividing the seats between the signatories.120 Permanent 
commissions were formed to draft and study laws, the 
most important of which dealt with political, legal and 
administrative matters. Ad hoc commissions of inquiry 
were also established, such as the Lutundula Commission 
(war-time contracts) and the Bakandeja Commission 
(audit of state-run enterprises).  
Donor support was crucial to the functioning of these 
commissions, which often lacked offices, administrative 
staff or legal experts. In the Commission on Political, 
Administrative and Legal Affairs, for example, the U.S. 
Agency for International Development (USAID) funded 
consultants to provide legal expertise, while other donors 
gave office equipment and paid communication costs. 
Many parliamentarians showed little interest in attending 
sessions or drafting laws. They were often indifferent 
to the nuances of the important bills on citizenship, 
amnesty and elections they approved and skipped training 
sessions provided by donors.121 The result was a legal 
process with disappointingly little Congolese ownership.  
The transition parliament spent relatively little time 
overseeing the executive branch. It was authorised under 
the old constitution to question ministers and launch 
commissions of inquiry into their activities. However, 
a two-thirds majority in the national assembly was 
needed to sanction a member of government, and the 
factionalised nature of the old parliament made this 
virtually impossible. For the president and vice presidents, 
 
 
120 Each main political group – RCD, MLC, PPRD, the political 
opposition and civil society – obtained 94 deputies and 22 
senators. The RCD-ML was given fifteen deputies and four 
senators, the Mai-Mai ten deputies and four senators, and the 
RCD-N five deputies and two senators. “Accord Global et 
Inclusif”, Annex 1. 
121 Crisis Group interview, donors, Kinshasa, December 2005. 
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a three-fourths majority was needed.122 The former 
belligerents, each with 94 seats in the national assembly, 
rarely agreed and did not want to set a precedent for 
their own ministers by pressing charges against others. 
In a telling incident, Minister of Justice Kisimba Ngoy at 
first refused to appear before parliament and then came 
only to declare that “even if there is an evaluation, the 
national assembly cannot overthrow the government”.123 
The new constitution is an improvement, allowing an 
absolute majority to sanction a member of government 
and two thirds to press charges against the president 
or prime minister.124 
Commissions of inquiry were few and poorly funded, 
forced to ask the executive for additional money which 
was rarely received, though donors helped some, like 
the one headed by Lutundula. Others, like the Bakandeja 
audit of state-run companies, had to raise their own 
funds.125 Administration of parliament was weak, with 
five different accounting systems producing a confusion 
of data.126 
The executive undermined the transition parliament, 
eroding the separation of powers. In July 2005, Kabila 
turned down a request for an extraordinary session of 
parliament to discuss the budget. In December 2005, 
after parliament had passed an amnesty that would 
have freed the assassins of his father, Laurent, he sent 
the law to the Supreme Court, which interpreted it so 
as to exclude assassination of a president. In February 
2006, the Supreme Court ruled – this time allegedly 
upon Vice President Bemba’s prompting – that all 
parliamentarians who had left their parties during the 
transition could be replaced by their parties, despite 
clear provisions in the constitution and internal legislative 
regulations that they could stay for the entire transition.127  
2. The weakness of the incoming parliament 
Oversight of the executive is a vital parliamentary task. 
As argued by the State Failure Task Force, which 
produced a comparative study across 97 post-conflict 
countries, there is a strong correlation between a weak 
 
 
122 Transition constitution, Articles 141-144. The president 
and vice presidents were only liable for treason, corruption 
or intentional violation of the constitution. 
123 “Le ministre Kisimba Ngoy indésirable au parlement”, La 
Conscience, 2 November 2005. Kisimba Ngoy later apologised 
for the tone of his comments and agreed to answer questions. 
124 Transition constitution, Article 166. 
125 “Commission d’examen des rapports d’audit des entreprises 
publique – rapport final”, national assembly document, 20 
November 2004.  
126 Crisis Group electronic correspondence, UN official, May 2006. 
127 Transition constitution, Articles 101 and 107. 
parliament and the likelihood that a country will fall 
back into conflict: 
The odds of [state] failure were seven times as 
high for regimes we identified as partial 
democracies [than for autocracies or full 
democracies]. The characteristic of partial 
democracies…is the combination of a powerful 
chief executive with a relatively fractious or 
ineffective legislature.128  
The new constitution and electoral law, brought into 
force in February and March 2006, respectively, created a 
relatively weak parliament that will be hard pressed to 
oversee and challenge the executive.  
 The electoral law provides for open lists for 
legislative elections, which means that voters will 
choose individuals and not lists established by 
political parties. In the immediate term, this has 
eroded the cohesion of parties. During the 
transition, 130 deputies and 40 senators changed 
parties.129 Weak parties will make it easier for 
the government to coopt and divide opposition. 
 The president has the right to dissolve the 
national assembly in case of a serious crisis 
between the legislative and executive branches.130 
While the national assembly has power in theory to 
sanction and even dismiss the government by an 
absolute majority vote, the threat of dissolution 
is likely to undermine the lower house’s inclination 
to check particularly the president. The president’s 
substantial powers could create dangerous 
resentments in a post-conflict situation where he 
is opposed to his former enemies, some of 
whom retain links to militias. 
 There are few requirements regarding the 
competence of parliamentarians. The minimum age 
is 25 for the national assembly and 30 for the senate. 
No minimum level of education is proscribed in 
either the constitution or electoral law. 
 The president will preside over the council of 
ministers instead of the prime minister. In contrast 
 
 
128 State Failure Task Force, op. cit., p. 14. The State Failure Task 
Force was founded in 1994 at the request of senior policymakers 
in the U.S. government and includes academics from a wide 
range of universities in that country. The task force has also found 
substantial correlation between high rates of infant mortality and 
low levels of openness to trade, on the one hand, and the risks of 
state failure and widespread conflict on the other. The presence of 
civil conflicts in two or more neighbouring states was likewise 
strongly associated with state failure. 
129 Crisis Group interview, parliamentarian, Kinshasa, March 2006. 
130 Transition constitution, Article 148. 
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to ministers, the president does not have to answer 
to parliament for policy decisions. 
 The proportional voting system will continue to 
encourage party proliferation, which will in turn 
dilute the political opposition. There are 213 parties 
but only a half dozen are present throughout the 
country. Few have support outside their narrow, 
ethnic or regional base. As the transition has shown, 
these weak and poorly structured parties are 
easily coopted by more affluent parties.131  
 Additionally, the Union for Democracy and 
Social Progress (UDPS), the main opposition 
party, is boycotting both the presidential and 
legislative elections.132 Its absence will contribute 
to a toothless parliament.  
It will be difficult for strong opposition parties to 
develop in the current landscape. Parties have been banned 
for most of the country’s history, with brief windows 
of activity between 1960-1967 and 1990-1997. While 
Joseph Kabila repealed his father’s ban on party activities 
in 2001, most parties only slowly began setting up offices 
outside Kinshasa when the transition began in 2003.  
Toward the end of the transition, ethnic affiliations 
and personal ambitions have tended to become more 
important determinants of voting in parliament than 
party membership.133 Given that electoral districts are 
small,134 and electoral lists are open, members of 
parliament may often be constrained by the narrow 
interests of their community. In the two previous, 
brief periods of democratisation, ethnicity became the 
dominant feature of political discourse, making it difficult 
to lobby for substantive political changes and triggering 
politically motivated clashes in the Kivus and Katanga. 
This ethnicisation of political space will be a danger 
for the incoming parliament. 
B. THE COURT SYSTEM 
Courts have been in a dire state since the days of Mobutu, 
who stood above justice and could name and dismiss 
judges at his discretion. Courts were left to fend for 
themselves in the years of Zaire’s decline, living off the 
fees paid by litigants. The justice sector still suffers 
 
 
131 Crisis Group interview, political opposition and civil 
society members of parliament, Kinshasa, November 2005.  
132 For more detail on the UDPS boycott, see Crisis Group 
Africa Report N°108, Congo’s Elections: Making or Breaking 
the Peace, 27 April 2006. 
133 Crisis Group interview, MONUC official, Kinshasa, 
December 2005. 
134 They correspond to territories, a relatively small 
administrative unit. 
from political interference and lack of resources. There is 
only one judge for every 30,000 citizens, and an estimated 
80 per cent do not have access to courts.135 In 2005, 
the budget for the Ministry of Justice was $2 million, 
in contrast to the $17 million allocated to the presidency 
and $3 million to the national intelligence service.136  
Neglect of the judiciary, together with the weak police 
force in charge of implementing legal decisions, has made 
the penal system almost defunct. Estimates of the 
prison population vary between 9,000 (official) and 
55,000 (NGOs). Prisoners often live in inhumane 
conditions, and jailbreaks are frequent.137 Prisoners 
frequently are held for months without trial in make-
shift jails, sometimes just a hole in the ground. In South 
Kivu and Maniema, where 4.5 million live, there are 
only three prisons.138 
The new constitution has replaced the Supreme Court 
with three new courts:  
 the High Court of Appeals (Cour de cassation), 
which can also hear cases against members of 
government, parliamentarians, governors and vice 
governors;  
 the Constitutional Court, which can hear cases 
against the prime minister and the president in 
addition to interpreting the constitution; and  
 The State Council (Conseil d’État), with 
jurisdiction over civil cases brought against 
central administrative authorities.  
However, these courts will not be set up until after the 
inauguration of a new government. They will require 
significant additional funding and support to fulfil 
their mandates. 
The judiciary is incapable of providing checks and 
balances between the executive and the legislative 
branches. Politicians regularly interfere with higher 
courts, undermining their authority. The new constitution, 
like its predecessor, guarantees the independence of 
the Supreme Council of Judges (Conseil supérieur de 
la magistrature), the body that names, promotes and 
sanctions judges.139 In practice, however, the minister of 
 
 
135 “S.O.S. Justice”, op. cit., p. 25; “A First Few Steps: A 
Long Road to a Just Peace in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo”, International Centre for Transitional Justice, 
October 2004. 
136 ”S.O.S. Justice”, op. cit., p. 266. 
137 “Audit organisationnel du secteur de la justice en 
Republique Démocratique du Congo”, Mission Conjointe 
Multibailleurs, May 2004, pp. 27, 60.  
138 “S.O.S. Justice”, op. cit., p. 71. 
139 Transition constitution, Article 147. 
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justice has continued to name judges, despite protests 
from the judges’ union and the Supreme Court.140  
The signatories of the peace deal agreed on two laws 
to organise the judiciary: a law on the status of judges 
and a law on the Supreme Council of Judges. Bills 
were submitted to parliament in July and September 
2004, respectively, but the minister of justice sent 
them to the Commission for the Reform of Congolese 
Law, a body not functional since 2003, where they 
languished until April 2006, when they were put back 
on the parliament’s agenda.141 The law on the status of 
judges was passed by the lower house on 22 May 2006. 
While laws have been issued to structure smaller 
bodies such as the anti-corruption commission and the 
truth and reconciliation commission, the judiciary is 
the only branch of government that is still governed 
by Mobutu-era laws.  
The old Supreme Court, which remains in existence 
until after inauguration of the new government and 
has frequently been accused of bias, will have jurisdiction 
for disputes in the presidential and legislative elections.142 
All its judges were appointed by Joseph Kabila before 
the transition, and it has favoured him in several 
decisions.143  
The judiciary’s balance sheet is bleak. No corruption 
cases have been tried during the transition.144 A corruption 
law passed in 2003, which incorporated the UN 
Convention against Corruption and the African Union 
 
 
140 “S.O.S. Justice”, op. cit., p. 40. A decree (no. 03/27) issued 
in September 2003 contravened the constitution by placing the 
Supreme Council of Judges under the control of the Ministry 
of Justice. The national judges’ union SYNAMAC went on 
strike in October 2003 to protest the minister’s arbitrary 
promotion and sanctioning of dozens of judges, as well as 
poor working conditions. After months, three SYNAMAC 
leaders were banned from serving as judges by ministerial 
decree. These incidents triggered protest letters from civil 
society, but little mention in diplomatic circles. 
141 According to Article 130 of the new constitution (125 of the 
transition constitution), if the government does not act within 
two weeks on a draft bill, the national assembly can vote on it. 
The fact that the law took so long to adopt is, therefore, also due 
to the lack of initiative of the national assembly.  
142 Crisis Group interviews, NGOs and UN officials, Kinshasa, 
November and December 2005; “S.O.S. Justice”, op. cit., p. 43. 
143 After inauguration of the new government, new judges 
will be named for the three successor courts: of the nine 
members of the Constitutional Court, three are named by 
president, three by parliament, and three by the Supreme 
Council of Judges; the procedure for nomination of all other 
high court judges will be decided through separate laws that 
have not yet been passed.  
144 Crisis Group interview, Globalrights official, Kinshasa, 
April 2006. 
Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, has 
never been used.145  
Moreover, the weakness of the justice and penal system 
has had a particularly devastating effect on women due to 
the prevalence of sexual violence in the country. 
International legal experts believe sexual violence is 
the Congo’s most common violent crime.146 In four 
eastern provinces, 40,000 rapes were registered in 2004, 
which, considering the lack of reliable reporting, is the tip 
of the iceberg.147 Only 429 sexual violence prosecutions 
were brought in this region, however, with 66 convictions. 
Over 70 per cent of sentences were less than the mandatory 
minimum. Almost all cases concerned minors, as adult 
women rarely press charges.148 Only a thorough reform of 
the justice system that takes gender into consideration 
can address this situation.149  
In 2004, the EU launched a program to support the 
justice system in Ituri through the NGO Réseau des 
Citoyen Network (RCN), which rebuilt infrastructure 
and provided resources, including paying police, judges 
and defence lawyers. In May 2004, the European 
Commission – together with the UK, Belgium, France, 
MONUC, UNDP and the UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights – audited the justice sector, and in 
November an action plan was adopted.150 The EU will 
pursue the plan’s main recommendations: promoting 
independence of the justice sector and better access to 
courts, and reinforcing the legal institutions and their 
management tools. Donors established a mixed follow-up 
committee of international and Congolese officials in 
late 2005 to implement these reforms. However, the 
focus on elections has slowed progress.  
 
 
145 Crisis Group interview, Congolese legal experts, 
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146 Crisis Group interview, UN official, Kinshasa, November 2005. 
147 “DRC: Focus on rampant rape, despite end of war”, IRIN, 
8 March 2004. 
148 “S.O.S. Justice”, op. cit., pp. 131-133. 
149 See also Crisis Group Reports, Congo’s Elections and 
Security Sector Reform in the Congo, both op. cit., for 
further discussion of the weakness of the justice system with 
respect to women, including the suggestion that part of the 
necessary reform is establishment of a vice squad within the 
police with exclusive jurisdiction over sexual violence cases. 
150 “Audit organisationnel du secteur de la justice en 
République Démocratique du Congo”, Mission Conjointe 
Multi-bailleurs, May 2004, pp. 27, 60. 
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C. OTHER OVERSIGHT BODIES: GOOD ON 
PAPER, WEAK IN REALITY 
1. Anti-corruption bodies 
There is no lack of institutions or laws in the Congo to 
combat corruption and the abuse of power. The very 
proliferation of institutions and their lack of coordination 
have undermined efficiency but the real problems are 
the lack of capacity and, more fundamentally, the lack 
of will in parliament and the executive to provide the 
resources and authority necessary to investigate and 
sanction. Donors have also not prioritised support to 
anti-corruption bodies.  
Since the late-1980s, when the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund pressured Mobutu to 
clean up corruption, a number of anti-corruption 
bodies and strategies have been put in place. None has 
borne fruit, and findings are often disregarded.  
 The State Auditor (Cour des comptes) is perhaps 
the most respected auditing mechanism. Headed 
by Professor Mabi Mulumba since the 1990s, it 
is a tool of parliamentary oversight and reports 
to the national assembly. It also reviews the state 
accounts on a yearly basis. However, it does not 
have an office of its own and, until the African 
Development Bank agreed to provide $500,000 
in 2006, only a fraction of its budget was funded.151 
Its 2005 audit found vast overspending on line 
items in the budget falling under the president and 
the four vice presidents but those concerned 
were not sanctioned. The auditor does not have 
the right to audit the president directly.152 
 The Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission is an 
institution of the transition, with a mandate to 
investigate “violations of ethical values and corrupt 
activities”.153 It was authorised only in October 
2004, fourteen months after the transition began, 
and given a paltry monthly operating budget of 
$2,400. Donors helped, but the commission was 
itself accused of corruption and in October 2005 
they suspended collaboration.154 It has completed 
no investigations, and its mandate expires with the 
transition.  
 The Financial Inspectorate was created in 
Mobutu’s final years as part of the ministry of 
 
 
151 In 2002, it received only $3,000 of its $200,000 budget.  
152 Crisis Group interview, State Auditor, Kinshasa, December 
2005. 
153 “Case study on the DR Congo”, op. cit., p. 17. 
154 Ibid, p. 22. 
finance. While its mandate is roughly the same 
as the State Auditor, it works strictly on demand of 
the ministry and cannot publish its reports.  
2. Civil society 
Civil society has played an important role during the 
wars and the peace process, especially in the East, where 
together with churches, non-governmental organisations 
have stepped in to assume roles that state institutions 
had abandoned. They participated in the Sun City talks and 
became members of the transitional institutions, with 
116 seats in parliament and four ministerial portfolios.  
Civil society’s involvement in government has been a 
double-edged sword, however. It has allowed it to 
exert a much greater influence on state policy but it 
has also become deeply politicised and coopted by 
political parties.155 The end of the transition marks the 
end of civil society’s participation in government, and 
many of its major figures have left their associations 
to join parties or campaign as independent candidates. 
One of the most successful efforts to harness the influence 
of these actors has been through the Social Movement 
for Renewal (MSR), a party founded by Pierre Lumbi, 
a Kabila associate, which is fielding many former civil 
society leaders as its candidates in the East.156  
The departure of many former leaders has sapped the 
strength of civil society. If it is to fulfil its function as 
a counterbalance to the state, remaining leaders and 
donors will need to redouble their efforts during the 
next five years. It will also be crucial for NGOs to adapt to 
the new political realities by launching projects that are 
geared toward better use of the tools of the democratic 
system, for example tracking voting records and the 
performance of legislators, following the progress of 
the Poverty Reduction Strategy Program (PRSP) and 
conducting civic education programs to teach voters 
how to hold their representatives accountable. 
 
 
155 In Kinshasa, this politicisation pre-dated the transition, as 
Laurent Kabila’s banning of political parties prompted many 
politicians to set up NGOs to press for political agendas. But 
in the East, where civil society had often been able to check 
or at least publicise the abuses of rebel movements, the 
politicisation became noticeable during the transition. 
156 In South Kivu, for example, MSR candidates include Zita 
Kavungirwa, a leading women’s rights activist; Aurelie 
Bitondo, a development worker and the vice governor of the 
province; and Dunia Bitakuya, leader of a community 
organisation in Kalehe territory. 
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V. THE INTERNATIONAL APPROACH 
TO REFORM 
A. THE WORLD BANK GROUP AND THE 
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 
The World Bank Group has given $2.3 billion in loans 
and grants to the Congo in the past five years, making 
it by far the largest contributor.157 Due to the limits of 
its mandate, however, it has refrained from involvement in 
the political arena, which has significantly hampered 
the impact of reform. Nonetheless, it has been able to 
improve management of state finances, the mining 
sector and civil services.158  
As helpful as these reforms have been, an international 
fiscal expert commented: “Systems are good – but if 
the people in the systems are corrupt, you have not 
gotten very far”.159 The lack of enforcement has 
meant that many reforms have remained hollow. The 
mining sector offers an example.160 Since the mining 
code was introduced in 2002, several contracts have 
been signed that contravene it. In 2003 a Bank-
commissioned study of Gécamines by International 
Mining Consultants (IMC)161 recommended the immediate 
dismissal of all Gécamines directors and that international 
experts renegotiate the company’s joint ventures. In 
particular, as described above, it recommended against 
proceeding with deals with two foreign mining companies: 
Global Enterprises Corporate (GEC) and Kinross-
Forrest. Gécamines’ director was not dismissed until 
December 2005, and the two deals were signed in 
August 2005. The World Bank argued that the IMC 
study was only one factor informing its plans for reforming 
Gécamines, and other considerations prevented it 
from implementing the recommendations.162  
 
 
157 “The World Bank in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo”, op. cit. 
158 Reforms implemented by the World Bank include new 
procedures regarding cost chain management; a civil servant 
retirement program, in particular for over 10,000 Gécamines 
workers; new investment, mining and forestry codes to meet 
international standards; and reform of the procurement and 
tendering process. 
159 Crisis Group interview, fiscal expert, New York, January 2006. 
160 According to a mining company official, businesses often 
have to pay up to 5 per cent export tax, though the official 
level is 2 per cent.  
161 The contents of this paragraph stem mostly from the 
report “The State vs. the People”, op. cit., pp. 44-45. 
162 Crisis Group telephone interview, World Bank official, 
April 2006. 
While the Bank is not directly to blame for these 
contracts, it could do more to promote transparency 
and accountability in the mining sector, where it carries a 
lot of weight, not least because it is funding the 
retirement of thousands of Gécamines employees as 
well as pushing for privatisation. Above all, it needs 
to make sure that state-owned assets are put up for  
open and transparent tender.  
World Bank officials are aware of the continuing 
corruption and institutional problems but point out 
they are dealing with a sovereign government and that 
cutting off aid would be counterproductive.163 Nonetheless, 
the Bank needs to invest more in strengthening the 
capacity of the government institutions to manage 
their funds and their own revenues. If the Bank itself 
cannot exert adequate pressure due to the limitations 
set by its mandate, it must work with member states – 
in particular the major actors in the Congo such as the 
U.S., UK, South Africa, France, Belgium and China. 
But there is little coordination between international 
financial institutions and the embassies, the EU and 
the UN in Kinshasa. 
In May 2006, the IMF announced it would not disburse 
$40 million dollars in new loans after the Congo failed to 
pass a review of the Poverty Reduction and Growth 
Facility (PRGF) program.164 The World Bank, however, 
has been reluctant to pull out because it does not want 
to destabilise the government.  
B. UNITED NATIONS AND REFORM  
There has been little effort to couple technical reforms 
with political pressure for good governance. In May 
2005, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan recommended 
forming a donors’ group to coordinate action on good 
governance.165 The UN wanted to include the World 
Bank and the IMF in the group, as well as Congolese 
institutions, such as the finance and budget ministries. 
The initiative foundered on the objections of Security 
Council members, including China, Russia, Brazil and 
Algeria, who believed it would infringe on Congolese 
sovereignty and set an unwelcome precedent.166 President 
 
 
163 Crisis Group interview, World Bank official, Kinshasa, 
December 2005. 
164 “Congo needs elections for new IMF deal – minister”, 
Reuters, 11 May 2006. 
165 “Special Report of the Secretary-General on Elections in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo”, May 2005, p. 8. 
166 Crisis Group interview, UN officials, Kinshasa and New 
York, December 2005. 
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Kabila also expressed misgivings when the Security 
Council visited the region in November 2005.167 
Many Congolese actors, however, have supported the 
idea of an international mechanism for promoting 
good governance.168 Officials in the ministry of mines 
and Gécamines, for example, protested vehemently 
about the contracts signed with Kinross Forrest Limited 
and GEC in 2005.169 Churches and NGOs have persistently 
protested corruption. While national sovereignty is always 
a legitimate point to consider, a Congolese NGO 
official reasonably asked: “Are they talking about the 
sovereignty of a rich few, or the sovereignty of 60 
million Congolese?”170 
The idea was kept (barely) alive by Security Council 
Resolution 1635 (2005), which stated that MONUC should 
coordinate with donors to:  
provide advice and assistance as well as the 
necessary support, to the effective follow-up to 
the meeting on 21 September 2005 between the 
[Presidential Office] and the International 
Committee in Support of the Transition, to 
strengthen support for good governance and 
transparent economic management.171 
The Security Council, however, dropped the reference 
to an “arrangement” that had featured in resolution 
1621 (2005) and had been interpreted by many in 
MONUC as authorising a mechanism of good 
governance.172 MONUC has continued to hold ad hoc 
meetings with donors and Congolese institutions to 
discuss corruption but the lack of a Security Council 
mandate and donor support has undermined this initiative. 
 
 
167 Crisis Group interview, diplomat, Kinshasa, December 2005. 
168 This includes Vice President Ruberwa as well as 
ministers from several parties. Crisis Group interviews, 
Kinshasa, November and December 2005. 
169 Crisis Group interview, Rights and Accountability in 
Development (RAID), April 2006. 
170 Crisis Group interview, Congolese NGO, Kinshasa, 
March 2006. 
171 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1635, 
paragraph 7. 
172 Resolution 1621 encouraged MONUC “to provide advice 
and assistance, as well as the necessary support, to the 
setting up by the transitional government, international 
financial institutions and donors, of an arrangement to 
strengthen support for good governance and transparent 
economic management”.  
C. THE MULTINATIONALS  
Multinational corporations have contributed to the 
cycle of graft, state weakness and violence over the 
past decade, and indeed since independence. It is 
important to highlight their responsibility and hold 
them to the same standards as in the countries where 
they are incorporated. The president of the World 
Bank, Paul Wolfowitz, commented regarding corruption:  
Every corrupt transaction has two parties. 
There’s if you like a corruptor and a corruptee, 
and frequently the corruptor is some company 
in a developed country or some developed country 
or even a multilateral institution that made a loan 
to people they shouldn't have made a loan 
to.173  
Most guidelines and regulations for multinational 
corporations are voluntary and non-binding, the exceptions 
being the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) Convention on Combating Bribery. Both 
make bribing a public official in a foreign country a 
crime. The OECD convention has 30 parties, who 
have incorporated it into national legislation. However, 
there are few enforcement mechanisms for these laws, 
and justice officials often remain unaware of the behaviour 
of companies abroad. Congolese and international NGOs 
have played an important role in collecting information and 
raising awareness but much more needs to be done. 
The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) 
has similar enforcement problems. Countries that sign 
up must publish all revenues they receive from companies 
in the natural resources sector, while companies must 
make public their payments. Both the government and 
the companies must undergo a private audit under 
international standards. The Congo signed EITI in 
November 2005 and created a national committee with 
representatives from civil society, the government and 
the private sector to implement its criteria. However, no 
concrete steps have been taken on publishing payments or 
revenues. 
The Kimberly Process for diamonds is another example 
of a good plan with little implementation. All signatories 
of the process are required to ensure that exported 
diamonds do not fuel violence, human rights abuses or 
conflict and issue certificates to accompany every package. 
Signatories are also to establish internal controls to 
enforce this process. However, in the Congo, while 
there is a government agency that issues certificates in 
 
 
173 “Interview of World Bank President Paul Wolfowitz with 
Associated Press Television”, 5 July 2005, www.worldbank.org. 
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accordance with the process, there are few internal 
mechanisms actually to enforce the regulations. It is, 
therefore, difficult to track the origins of many of 
these diamonds.174 Moreover, even if all strictly conflict 
diamonds were excluded from exports, the state institutions 
and companies that deal with diamonds would still be 
plagued with allegations of corruption.175 
Export credits are not used enough to promote 
accountability and sanction abuse. All main bilateral 
Congo donors have export credit agencies that provide 
political risk insurance and subsidised loans for 
companies investing where commercial insurance or 
loans are difficult to obtain. OECD countries agreed on 
recommendations for regulating export credits in 2003 
but these are not binding and cover only environmental 
hazards, not social or governance issues. Donors should 
coordinate with anti-corruption bodies and civil society to 
use export credits to promote accountability and 
transparency within companies. They should make 
disclosure of taxes, fees and other payments to foreign 
governments a condition for receiving credits.  
D. IN SEARCH OF A COMMON APPROACH 
TO REFORM 
The international community has been a major player 
in the Congolese transition, indeed a formal part of it 
through the International Committee for the Support 
of the Transition (CIAT), the body which has coordinated 
the actions of the major international actors in the country 
but will go out of existence with the elections.176 It 
contributes 56 per cent of the national budget. The 
international development agencies of the U.S., the UK, 
the EU, Belgium and France have all launched good 
governance projects – albeit relatively low-cost ones 
– with the Congolese government.177 In order to 
 
 
174 “Reforming the DRC Diamond Sector”, Global Witness, 
June 2006, p. 3 
175 Ibid, p. 2 
176 Annex IV, articles 1-4 of the peace agreement indicate, among 
other things, that CIAT will mediate and decide any disagreement 
between signatories and help the transitional government fulfil its 
mandate. CIAT is composed of Angola, Belgium, Canada, China, 
France, Gabon, Mozambique, Republic of Congo, Russia, South 
Africa, the UK, the U.S., Zambia, the African Union/African 
Commission and the European Union/European Commission and 
is chaired by MONUC. 
177 The European Union has the most substantial project, 
having pledged to invest $41 million in governance over the 
next four years. France, Beligum and the UK have supported 
the reform of the justice sector and civil service, and the U.S. 
has provided support to parliament and funded a project 
focused on the management of mining revenues in local 
communities in Katanga. 
coordinate their actions and to condition their 
investments on greater reform by the Congolese 
government, donors have developed three overarching 
plans to promote good governance with their 
Congolese counterparts: the Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Paper (PRSP), a “governance compact” drafted by the 
EU and the World Bank, and the Congo Action Plan 
led by UNDP and MONUC. 
The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) being 
prepared by the ministry of planning, with outside 
consultant advice and after consultations with civil 
society, local and national officials, is intended to 
provide the framework for donor funding. While it 
has not been finalised, one of its five pillars is directed at 
consolidating peace, promoting good governance and 
building state institutions.178 It proposes numerous ways 
to combat corruption and build state institutions.179 
Good governance initiatives are to be managed by a 
National Program in Support of Governance.  
The second document, drafted by the European 
Commission with the World Bank, is a “governance 
compact” to provide much-needed operational detail 
for the PRSP. It includes many innovative ideas, 
including recruiting a legal firm to review periodically the 
handling of key corruption cases, setting up a trust 
fund to raise salaries of select senior civil servants 
and cancelling mining contracts unfavourable to the 
government.180 However, the recommendations made 
in this document are presented in the conditional tense, 
pending approval by all donors and, most importantly, 
by the Congolese government.  
UNDP has produced a third plan for jumpstarting needed 
governance reforms. Its Congo Action Plan was 
 
 
178 The other four are: restarting economic activity and 
consolidating growth; improving access to social services and 
reducing vulnerability; fighting HIV/AIDS; and supporting 
communal development.  
179 These include: a census of civil servants and the army and 
an increase in their wages; an audit of social services at the 
local level, in particular in education, health and justice 
sectors; retirement of all civil servants of a certain age and 
seniority, with World Bank help; decentralisation of 
administration and resource managements; reform of the 
justice sector based on recommendations of an audit by 
donors; strengthening the state’s audit and control 
mechanisms and periodically reviewing public spending; a 
National Program against Corruption, including a website 
where complaints can be submitted and corruption cases 
followed; and encouragement of mining companies to 
operate more transparently in order to conform with the 
Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative. 
180 Crisis Group interview, UN official, Kinshasa, June 2006. 
These ideas were put forward for discussion, not as a 
definitive plan. 
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launched in February 2006 to spur fundraising and 
coordinate humanitarian and development aid for one 
year. It tripled the aid request over the previous year 
to $705 million. However, by July 2006, only $183 
million had been donated or pledged.181 The Action 
Plan includes budgets for emergency aid to those in 
acute need and development aid to local communities.182 
A third component, not yet released, will focus on 
good governance and building state institutions; it is 
intended to develop and strengthen parts of the PRSP. 
The UN plans on asking for around $200 million over 
two years to fund this part of the proposal, but there is 
little sign that donors are willing to invest that much.183 
The combined present good governance funding of 
the U.S., UK, EU and Belgium is less than $40 million 
for 2006.  
 
 
181 “Consolidated Appeal: Democratic Republic of Congo Action 
Plan 2006”, Financial Tracking Service, www.reliefweb.int/fts.  
182 “Action Plan 2006 – Democratic Republic of Congo”, 
Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 
February 2006. 
183 Crisis Group telephone interview, UN official, May 2006. 
VI. THE WAY FORWARD 
These plans are a good start. However, all, in particular 
the PRSP, are vague on details and implementation, 
with little mention of how auditing and control 
mechanisms are to be strengthened. The importance of 
political checks and balances from the parliament, 
political parties and the court system is not mentioned 
in detail. The “governance compact”, which contains 
many innovative suggestions, is still in draft form and 
will depend largely on the will of all donors, including 
financial institutions, to pressure the Congolese 
government to accept far-reaching and sometimes intrusive 
reforms. Given the relative lack of coordination among 
donors in Kinshasa, it will be difficult to carry all 
these suggestions through. 
There must be three steps to reform. First, Congolese 
control mechanisms must be strengthened, in particular 
parliament and courts. Secondly, donors must better 
coordinate and substantially increase their aid if they 
want to consolidate the advances made in the peace 
process. Previous efforts to improve the state’s capacity to 
collect and use revenues must be intensified but 
particular attention should also be paid to the political 
dimension of good governance by strengthening state 
institutions and battling impunity. For this donors need a 
coordination body in Kinshasa to replace CIAT, 
whose mandate expires at the elections. Finally, 
special attention must be paid to enhancing good 
governance in the natural resources sector by ensuring 
the government as well as foreign companies abide by 
domestic and international regulations. 
A. STRENGTHENING CONGOLESE 
CONTROL MECHANISMS 
The only way to guarantee long-term stability in the 
Congo is by supporting self-sustaining institutions 
that can keep the government and administration in 
check. These already exist on paper but are under-
funded and lack political clout. As a start, donors should 
make parliamentary support a priority by supporting 
parliamentary commissions technically and financially, in 
particular the Commission on Economic and Financial 
Affairs – as well as the State Auditor, who answers to 
the national assembly. Equally important is rehabilitation 
of the justice sector, which should build on lessons 
learned by the EU-funded justice program in Ituri. 
Donors need to make sure that oversight bodies have 
enough staff and resources, in both Kinshasa and the 
interior. While these bodies should eventually be 
funded by the government, for the time being they will 
not be able to function without outside support. 
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Initially, international observers are needed to reinforce 
the oversight bodies. There is a long history of complicity 
in corruption between these institutions and the 
administration. Crisis Group interviews with staff in 
ministries, state-run companies and the private sector 
indicate many anti-corruption mechanisms receive 
kickbacks and look the other way instead of reporting 
graft.184 In the words of a state employee, “wolves 
don’t eat each other”.185  
Raising salaries would create a climate in which 
corruption could be tackled, but in itself is not enough. 
For an initial period, donors and the government 
should create a small coordination and oversight body 
within the National Program in Support of Good 
Governance, staffed by experienced international 
personnel, who should be deployed to anti-corruption 
bodies, including the State Auditor, the Financial 
Inspectorate and the Anti-Corruption Commission, 
and be involved in all audits and investigations, thus 
helping to train Congolese. The president, on parliament’s 
proposal, should name an anti-corruption czar to chair 
the board and to lead on promoting good governance. 
The czar should update parliament regularly and open 
a website where complaints could be submitted and 
financial audits and parliamentary reports posted. 
The new provincial assemblies are also crucial for 
limiting government excesses. The constitution has 
created 26 provinces from the current eleven,186 with 
locally-elected assemblies that in turn are to name senators 
and governors. Three years are allowed for their 
establishment. The assemblies will have rights and duties 
similar to those of the national parliament and provide 
controls over local abuse of power.  
As the provincial government will manage 40 per cent 
of national taxes levied in their provinces and all local 
taxes, the stakes are high. It is unlikely, however, 
these bodies will have enough money or training for 
their tasks. If not properly set up, provincial governments 
could turn to decentralised despotism and corruption. The 
international community should prepare a special 
program to assist creation of these bodies, and parliaments 
in other countries, such as the Amani forum of 
parliamentarians from Great Lakes countries, should 
consider sending delegations to train and assist their 
new colleagues at the national and provincial level.  
For all these bodies, the government should take concrete 
steps to implement constitutional provisions requiring 
 
 
184 Crisis Group interviews, Kinshasa, November 2005 to 
May 2006. 
185 Crisis Group interview, state employee, Kinshasa, May 2006. 
186 Strictly speaking, it is 25 plus the capital, Kinshasa. 
gender parity in local, provincial and national institutions. 
A law requiring 20 per cent of members of these 
bodies to be women would be a start. 
Another method of targeting corruption is to require 
declaration of the private assets of office holders before 
and after their tenure, as provided for by the new 
constitution.187 The ministry of finance will be in charge 
of registering these declarations. These provisions, 
however, will be meaningless if the ministry does not 
review the veracity of declarations. An independent 
cell should be created within it to collect and investigate 
them. Donors should help train this cell, for example 
by hiring an international auditing company to assist 
the investigations.  
All these provisions should be included in the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), which will be the 
blueprint for future action on good governance once it 
is issued by the new government. 
B. DONOR COORDINATION AND GOOD 
GOVERNANCE  
As noted, CIAT, which coordinates the actions of major 
international actors in the Congo, is being dissolved 
with the end of the transition. The incoming 
government could take advantage of a vacuum to play 
donors off against each other.188 CIAT suffered from 
the sheer size of its membership and from the lack of 
cohesion of those members, especially towards the 
end of the transition. While the UN is drafting a plan 
for a new structure, it is unlikely that any UN body 
will be able to obtain a robust enough mandate for 
promoting good governance from the Security 
Council. The full membership of the old CIAT may 
eventually create a “Group of Friends” similar to it 
but what is essential is for the most important donors 
– including the UK, U.S., France, Belgium, South 
Africa, the EU, the World Bank and the IMF – to 
form a donors group on good governance. Discussions 
should be held regularly with the new government in 
this forum, which should be used to coordinate not 
only projects but also political pressure. 
At the same time, MONUC should use its Security 
Council Resolution 1635 mandate to “provide advice 
and assistance as well as the necessary 
support…[and] strengthen support for good 
governance and transparent economic management”. 
In coordination with UNDP, it should open a cell 
 
 
187 Transition constitution, Article 99. 
188 Crisis Group interviews, Kinshasa, November and 
December 2005. 
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within its political affairs section to focus on promoting 
good governance and become the secretariat of the 
donors group.  
C. PROMOTING ACCOUNTABILITY IN 
NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT  
The Lutundula Commission is an example of what 
can be achieved by Congolese good governance 
initiatives. Despite political pressure not to dig deep, it 
produced a thorough report. Its fate to date, however, 
is also an example of how good local efforts can by 
stymied. The report should be discussed urgently by 
parliament, as soon as possible after elections, and both 
donors and the government should revise or cancel 
contracts that are undervalued or tainted by corruption. A 
new permanent parliamentary commission should then 
be launched with a broader mandate to oversee good 
governance in the natural resources sector, including 
reviewing contracts signed during the transition. It 
should have at its disposal the services of a Congolese 
or international law firm specialising in mining law.  
Parallel to creation of a coordination body within the 
government, donors, as part of their new coordination 
group on good governance, should create an oversight 
board for natural resources, together with the World 
Bank, which has invested millions of dollars in this 
sector, Congolese authorities and civil society. This 
board would help minimise transaction costs and 
eliminate bribes for international companies seeking 
to invest and centralise information and complaints 
regarding the mining and forestry sectors. International 
NGOs should be hired to follow up on implementation of 
reform in these sectors and work with the ministries 
to monitor compliance. This approach was relatively 
successful in Cambodia, where Global Witness served 
as an independent monitor in the forestry sector from 
1999 until the government terminated the contract in 
2003.189  
The signing of the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative was a good step but the incoming parliament 
should prioritise passage of a bill making disclosure 
of payments and greater transparency part of domestic 
law. This bill should amend the mining code to make 
open tender for any state asset that is to be sold 
obligatory, in particular mining concessions, and to 
ensure that commercial confidentiality requirements 
do not prevent disclosure of mining revenue and 
 
 
189 http://www.globalwitness.org/campaigns/forests/cambodia/ 
monitoring.php. Global Witness was part of the Forestry Crime 
Monitoring Unit, which also had offices in the department of 
forestry and wildlife and the ministry of environment.  
payments.190 All these financial transactions should be 
published on a state website. 
The illegal exploitation of Congolese wealth has often 
happened with the complicity of foreign companies. 
These need to be held to the laws and standards of the 
countries where they are incorporated. Numerous 
interviews with international mining experts indicate 
that companies continue to pay bribes and give kickbacks 
to obtain lucrative deals in the Congo.191 For OECD-
country companies, this is illegal and should trigger 
domestic investigations.  
Finally, in order to prevent natural resources from illicitly 
benefiting militias or crime rings, the Congolese security 
forces should be deployed to secure areas of important 
mineral reserves in Katanga, the Kivus and Ituri.192 
 
 
190 The latter provision is meant to avoid the difficulty 
experienced in Timor Leste where its lack hampered 
transparency. “Revenue transparency in Timor Leste”, Global 
Witness, September 2004. 
191 “The State vs. the People”, op. cit., p. 34; Crisis Group 
interview, international mining expert, Kinshasa, July 2005. 
192 Ideally, this task should be undertaken by a gendarmerie 
trained to deal with criminal gangs and protect the 
population, while the army would be tasked primarily with 
protecting the borders. Crisis Group Report, Security Sector 
Reform in the Congo, op. cit. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Many decision-makers, both in the international 
community and the Congo, tend to see corruption as a 
deplorable but inevitable fact of life. In the words of a 
senior diplomat in Kinshasa: 
Corruption in the Congo has elicited superlatives 
since the days of Mobutu. The system that is in 
place stretched from the president to the minister 
to the lowly civil servant. We cannot change 
this system from one day to the next. We also have 
to be careful [not] to cut them off from their 
sources of income too quickly – in this post-
conflict situation, which could quickly lead to 
further armed violence.193  
The opposite argument, however, is stronger. As long 
as the principle access to resources is through public 
office, strongmen will use any means necessary – 
including insurrection – to gain public office. This 
year’s elections will create a significant class of 
disenfranchised politicians. Given the poor state of 
the national security forces and the many disgruntled 
soldiers, renewed violence is likely before the next 
electoral cycle in five years if action is not taken now. 
Inability to express political grievances through the 
political system and state dominance over economic 
activity are what is likely to encourage politicians to 
take up arms again. 
Donor focus should be on promoting institutions that 
can sustain reforms. Parliament, the strongest political 
check on the executive, should receive particular attention 
and funding, on both the national and provincial level. 
The State Auditor, the legislature’s main financial 
tool, is also very important. The judiciary needs a 
complete – and expensive – overhaul; in many places 
courts must literally be rebuilt from the ground up. 
The collapse of the Congolese state has never been 
just a national affair. Other countries and multinational 
corporations have been complicit in and at times have 
fanned the flames of state failure. Donors must be 
consistent in their approach and hold foreign companies 
to the rigorous standards of international and Congolese 
law. Foreign ministers who have criticised impunity 
in the Congo must also act decisively against mining 
and forestry companies that have spurned labour, 
environmental and financial regulations and laws. 
 
 
193 Crisis Group interview, diplomat, Kinshasa, July 2005. 
The next five years will be the most trying time of the 
peace process. Those who lose at the polls will be 
tempted to return to arms, while donors are already 
suggesting they want to start extricating themselves or 
at least be less politically engaged. At the same time, 
however, these years can be the most promising since 
independence if Congolese leaders and their international 
counterparts can manage to build a state that is no 
longer seen as the enemy of the people.  
Nairobi/Brussels, 20 July 2006 
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